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The defense budget of the United States has been reduced significantly since the
end of the cold war. Additionally, the procurement and investment accounts have been
cut by a greater percentage than the overall defense budget. To remain profitable many
defense firms have merged or acquired other defense firms, closed underutilized facilities
and reduced the defense-related workforce. The consolidation of the defense industry has
raised concerns about the level of competition within the industry, the ability to compete
against foreign firms, and dependence on foreign manufacturers.
Government policy preventing consolidation of the defense industry may have
resulted in weaker, smaller, and less efficient firms trying to compete against foreign
suppliers. Further, an autarkic defense industrial base may be too expensive to maintain
and may be unable to respond to the Government's need the way an integrated
competitive global market could.
In a prepared statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology USD (A&T) stated "We must
restructure the defense industrial base in order to achieve civil-military integration: to
broaden the industrial base (for greater efficiency and competitiveness) and to take full
advantage of the commercial information technology revolution." [Ref. 1]
Civil-military integration is offered as a solution to providing a larger, stronger,
and more-competitive defense industrial base. However, many existing policies and
regulations interfere with civil-military integration by discouraging firms from
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contracting with the Department of Defense (DoD). An understanding of the differences
between the traditional defense market and the free market, and the barriers that separate
them, is needed before integration can be accomplished.
B. OBJECTIVES
The primary objective of this thesis is to determine what role the Government
should have in the integration or expansion of the defense industrial base. Should it be a
paternalistic regulator or a promoter of a free market?
Other objectives are to determine the desirable characteristics of the defense
industrial base and to find if the benefits of civil-military integration outweigh the costs.
C. SCOPE
This thesis identifies the differences between the weapons acquisition market and
the traditional free market in which commercial firms operate. Policies aimed at
promoting civil-military integration to expand the industrial base will be discussed as
well as the barriers that discourage integration. Due to the importance of the defense
industrial base to national security, the policies discussed were not based solely on
economic criteria. This thesis will make an assessment of whether the industrial base
should be expanded by reducing barriers and encouraging free-market actions or by
regulating and managing the structure of the base.
The information provided in this thesis will furnish procurement officials with an
understanding of the dynamics of the supply side of the defense market.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
To achieve the objectives of this study, the primary research question was:
Is civil-military integration a viable policy option for expanding the industrial base?
From the basic research question, the following subsidiary questions were developed:
1
.
How does the weapons market differ from the free market?
2. What are the benefits of a strong defense industrial base?
3. What are the benefits and costs of civil-military integration?
4. What are the barriers to civil-military integration?
5. At what stage of the acquisition cycle should efforts be directed at
expanding the industrial base though civil-military integration?
E. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS
Three primary assumptions relevant to this study have been made. First, the
reader understands basic economic theory. Second, the literature reviewed for this study
is complete and accurate as of the date of this study. Finally, defense contractors respond
to incentives and disincentives similar to other commercial firms when free of
Government interference.
Several ideas and thoughts presented in the first part of this thesis are shared by
multiple sources; however they will be referenced to only one source.
F. METHODOLOGY
The data for this study were obtained from several sources. First the researcher
conducted an extensive review of available literature. This literature review consisted of
a local library search, intra-library loans, a custom search on LEXIS/NEXIS, and use of
the Internet.
Secondly, several telephone interviews were conducted with various individuals
involved in DoD acquisition policy.
G. THESIS ORGANIZATION
This thesis consists of seven chapters. This chapter provides the objectives,
scope, and methodology for data collection. Chapter II addresses the budget reductions
and consolidation of the defense industry. A comparison of the weapons market to the
free market is presented. Chapter III discusses civil-military integration as a means of
expanding the defense industrial base. Chapter IV discusses the benefits and costs of
civil-military integration. Chapter V addresses policies that may prevent expansion of
the defense industrial base through civil-military integration. Using the information
collected, Chapter VI provides an analysis of the information collected. Chapter VII
provides conclusions and recommendations for the best policy options regard expansion
of the defense industrial base through civil-military integration.
II. THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE
A. DEFINITION OF DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE
The defense industrial base (DIB) is defined as "the combination of people,
institutions, technology, and production capacity used to develop and manufacture the
weapons and supporting defense equipment needed to achieve our national security
objectives." [Ref. 2:p. 5] DIB is a subset of the larger national industrial base.
The DIB is also multi-dimensional. It comprises contractors, subcontractors and
parts suppliers, and it consists of companies that provide facilities supporting air, land
and sea systems. [Ref. 3:p. 184] These facilities may be privately owned and operated,
or Government-owned and contractor-operated, or Government-owned and Government-
operated. Many of the firms operate in multiple sectors of the base, either supplying
more than one system or serving as both a prime and subcontractor on different contracts.
The DIB should not be treated as a "single, homogeneous entity." The multi-
dimensional aspect of the DIB and the varying degrees of dependence on defense sales
make the development of any broad DIB policy difficult.
The three components of the DIB are: technology, production, and maintenance.
The technology component includes private industry, university, and
government laboratories, research facilities, and test centers that conduct
research.
The production component consists of private and public manufacturing
facilities, including Government-owned and Government-operated,
Government-owned and contractor-operated, and contractor-owned and
contractor-operated facilities.
The maintenance component consists of private and Government facilities
(such as arsenals and depots) that maintain and repair equipment. [Ref.
2:p. 5]
B. IMPORTANCE OF THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE
A strong defense industrial base enables the United States Government to respond
to contingencies such as those in Bosnia, and to deter threats from other nations.
Decisive victories such as Desert Shield and Desert Storm demonstrated that well-
equipped and technologically superior forces are needed to deter aggression. As changes
have occurred in the world's geographic, political, and economic structure, the Federal
budget and defense forces have adjusted force structure to meet current threats.
The break-up of the former Soviet Union resulted in a change of military strategy
and plans for the industrial base. The previous cold-war assumption that global
warfighting required expansive inventories of weapon systems, repair parts and
consumables has been replaced by the assumption of regional conflicts with smaller but
technically superior forces and just-in-time logistic support. According to the Swedish
International Peace Research Institute, thirty armed conflicts were fought throughout the
world in 1996. "Each conflict involved an ethnic faction, religious extremist group, or
terrorist organization; none pitted one recognized nation against another." [Ref. 4:p.
A 10] Although some of these groups may have been state-supported, this change in
strategy resulted in significant reductions in defense spending.
C. BENEFITS OF A DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE
There are several benefits to maintaining a defense industrial base: self-
sufficiency, less reliance on foreign supply, leverage, economic benefits, and security.
1. Self-Sufficiency and Capabilities
A benefit of self-sufficiency is that a nation will not have to rely on foreign
sources that may become unreliable during a conflict. A domestic defense industrial base
enables the Government to maintain a capability that it believes it will need in the future,
and enables the Government to avoid the cost and time required to recreate it. This was a
primary argument for not canceling the Seawolf submarine. Depending on the number of
foreign suppliers, foreign supply could also leave the buyer vulnerable to a monopoly
price increase. A domestic DIB should prevent a nation from becoming locked in to the
use of a foreign supplier who could then charge monopoly prices for spares and support.
Conversely the nation could become dependent on an inefficient domestic producer in
order to support self-sufficiency.
2. Less Reliance on Foreign Supply
Foreign supply may provide equipment not tailored to a nation's requirements. A
nation without a defense industrial base may have to rely on weapons designed and
manufactured for the originating country's needs rather than tailored to the threat facing
the purchaser. During time of conflict, support from a foreign supplier could also
disappear due to internal and/or external political pressures.
Countries such as the U.S. are still dependent on foreign materials and suppliers.
An assessment conducted on three U.S. Navy weapon systems found that the number of
foreign suppliers increased at the lower tiers of the contractor base from one percent of
second tier suppliers to 12 percent of fourth tier suppliers. The prime contractor is
considered the first tier, his subcontractors the second tier, and the subcontractor's
immediate suppliers the third, etc. Foreign sources ranged from five percent at the
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second tier for the HARM missile and Mark-48 torpedo to forty percent for the Verdin
communications system. The largest foreign supplier to the U.S. was Canada (42% of
foreign procurements) followed by Japan (19 percent), the United Kingdom (seven
percent), Germany (five percent), and South Africa (four percent). [Ref. 5:p. iii]
The Commerce Department also found that in the case of the weapon systems
studied, most foreign dependencies for the U.S. were for raw materials in which the
United States has no economically-viable concentration such as nickel, tantulum, and
chromite.
3. Leverage
A country with a strong DIB can use that leverage when negotiating with foreign
firms. Yet this importance should not be overstated. A country with a small DIB may
just as easily threaten to go to a rival supplier on the world market. A country looking for
tanks could threaten to buy M1A1 tanks from the U.S. supplier, General Dynamics, or
Challenger tanks made in the UK by Vickers. Countries without the capabilities to
develop and manufacture fighter aircraft may also shop the world market and negotiate
for lower prices or performance upgrades and further request offsets to help their balance
of trade.
4. Economic Benefits
According to Sandler, a defense industrial base provides national economic
benefits. [Ref 3:p. 185] The benefits take the form of jobs created, technological
advances, and exports. This is a Keynesian outlook and ignores the fact that those same
resources could possibly be used more efficiently in the private sector. When looking at
the nation as a whole, there is no evidence that money spent on defense creates more
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jobs or benefits the economy greater than money spent in the private sector. Even at the
local level there is evidence that private industry can provide benefits to the local
economy more efficiently than the Government.
When speaking strictly of jobs attributed to procurement funding, there are still
400,000 more defense contractor employees working in the U.S. industry today than were
working at the low point of the Cold War defense budget in 1976. [Ref. 6:p. 14]
However, according to the Aerospace Industry Association, aerospace employment
nationwide has declined 41 percent since 1989. [Ref. 7:p. 212] It is possible that the
aerospace workers changed careers and took employment in private industry or are now
employed in a field not categorized as aerospace.
5. Security
In an article titled "The Defense Technology and Industrial Base: Key Component
of National Power," Boezer argued that there is a close relationship between national
power and the nation's manufacturing capability. A vote on maintaining production
potential can have a profound affect on perceived power. "As the period between crises
increases, the industrial base grows cold from neglect and the risk to national security
increases correspondingly." [Ref. 8:p. 27] The National Security Act of 1947 requires
the National Security Council to:
...assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the
United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the
interest of national security, for the purpose of making recommendations
to the President in connection therewith. [Ref. 8:p. 27]
A strong industrial base can serve as a deterrent to potential adversaries. The
ability to implement a concept called Graduated Mobilization Response (GMR), which
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may be necessary to fight two major regional conflicts, is strengthened through
maintaining a "warm" industrial base.
D. COSTS OF A DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE
There is a lack of quantitative data on the cost of maintaining a defense industrial
base. The cost of maintaining national independence may be a lack of interoperability
with foreign suppliers in an alliance. [Ref. 3:p. 185] The cost of maintaining a capability
which a Government believes will be required in the future could be measured in the
purchase of an item not necessarily needed for defense but purchased to keep a
production line "warm." For example, the Bush Administration, with the concurrence of
the Pentagon and the Senate Armed Services Committee, proposed canceling the Seawolf
submarine program. However, General Dynamics' Electric Boat Division and its
subcontractors lobbied for the preservation of the program to maintain the capabilities
needed to manufacture submarines and to preserve 25,000 related jobs. [Ref. 9:p. 15] In
an op-ed piece in the Washington Post, Senator John McCain stated "Lacking any
mission to justify its cost, the Seawolf is really nothing more than a jobs program." [Ref.
10:p. A31]
There are also costs involved in not using foreign suppliers. A sole-source
domestic supplier can charge monopoly prices for spares and support. Reducing or
eliminating foreign sources of supply may prevent the attainment of efficiencies driven
by competition, resulting in overall higher life cycle costs. Foreign suppliers may also be
members of a military alliance such as NATO where standardization and interoperability
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are necessary. Members of the alliance could elect not to use the U.S. source and
therefore there is a cost associated with interoperability among several suppliers.
E. DECLINING DEFENSE BUDGET
Downsizing after a major military conflict is not new. As depicted in Figure 2.1,
there were significant downturns in defense spending after WW II, the Korean War and
the Vietnam War.
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Source: Developed by the researcher using National Defense Budget estimates for FY 1998.
Figure 2.1. Defense Expenditures 1948-1998
There are several differences in the drawdowns however. In World War II the
entire nation was mobilized to support the war effort. Later wars were more limited in
scope and did not require total mobilization of the U.S. economy. In Korea and Vietnam
the defense industry became more specialized from normal commercial production. The
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major difference between the Vietnam drawdown and the recent one is that, in the former
case, defense firms could simply opt to retrench and wait for the next defense buildup.
The Soviet threat was still there and the Warsaw Pact arms buildup continued unabated.
[Ref. 1 1 :p. 53]
Over the last decade defense procurement budgets have been reduced even more
dramatically than the overall defense budget. The decline in the procurement budget is
normally cited as the reason for the consolidation and merger of defense companies.
Indeed there has been a 67 percent drop in the procurement budget from the peak of
$136.6 billion in 1985 (1998 dollars) to $42.6 billion in 1998 as illustrated in Figure 2.2.
This latter number is less than half of the $95.2 billion spent on cigars and cigarettes
annually. [Ref. 12]
1975 !976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Fiscal Yur
Source: Developed by the researcher using National Defense Budget estimates for FY 1998.
Figure 2.2. Total DoD and Procurement Funding
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The decline in the procurement budget should be put in perspective. Studies of
defense acquisition over the past 25 years reveal that major weapon systems often take 20
years to develop from concept to full production [Ref. 13]. If the procurement budget is
measured over roughly the same period of time the decrease is not so dramatic. When
compared to 1975, the last year of the post-Vietnam drawdown, when there was still a
Soviet threat, the procurement budget has been reduced only twelve percent, from $48.6
billion in 1975 to $42.6 billion in 1998. [Ref. 14]
As illustrated in Figure 2.3, procurement as a share of the overall defense budget
is now under 20 percent, a level not seen since the Vietnam drawdown. The reduced
spending in procurement left many defense-related firms with excess capacity. By
acquiring other firms or merging, defense firms reduced excess capacity and promoted
more efficient operations.
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 198S 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Fiscal Year
Source: Developed by the researcher using National Defense Budget estimates for FY 1998.
Figure 2.3. Procurement Share of Defense Budget
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Weapons have also become more reliable and lethal over the ^ame period. As a
result, lower quantities of a particular weapon are needed. It is possible that the strategy
of using fever smarter weapons as opposed to large numbers of weapons fighting a war of
attrition may have contributed to the reductions in the procurement budget.
F. MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
In the past eight years, the value of military mergers has increased dramatically.
The Department of Defense has encouraged the consolidation and mergers. At a dinner,
commonly referred to as the "Last Supper," with the executives from the defense industry
in 1993, then Deputy Secretary of Defense William Perry informed those present that
roughly half of them would soon be eliminated from the supplier base. [Ref. 7:p. 211]
At the conclusion of World War II, the Pentagon purchased warplanes from twenty-six
companies. Today the military has three companies to choose from: Lockheed Martin,
Northrop Grumman, or Boeing. [Ref. 15:p. A21]
In 1991, mergers of defense related companies were valued at $300 million.
From 1992 to 1997 a total of $55 billion in military industry-mergers took place. [Ref.
16:p. 1] On July 3, 1997 Lockheed Martin announced its merger with Northrop
Grumman; both companies are products of mergers themselves. This was two days after
the Federal Trade Commission approved Boeing's buyout of McDonnell Douglas Corp.
and a day after the U.S. Justice Department approved Raytheon Corp.'s purchase of
Texas Instruments' defense and electronics unit in a $14 billion deal. The combination of
Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman would create a company with about $38 billion
in revenue and 240,00 employees. In comparison, there are 174,000 Marines on active
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duty. Some major defense companies such as General Motors, IBM, and Rockwell,
elected to leave the defense business altogether.
The Federal Government let market forces do most of the work rather than
directing the mergers. An added incentive to consolidate was the allowance of firms to
charge the cost of reorganizing as overhead to existing DoD contracts. On July 21, 1993
John M. Deutch, then Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Technology, wrote a
memorandum stating that restructuring costs are indeed allowable and thus reimbursable
under Federal procurement law.
The Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC) had disallowed recurring
restructuring costs in the past. As recently as the Bush Administration, DCMC had
rejected a request by the Hughes Aircraft Corp. to be reimbursed for $1 12 million in costs
resulting from its acquisition of General Dynamics. [Ref. 17:p. 24] The Aerospace
Industry Association, perceived this as a change in policy rather than a clarification and
requested notice of this change be posted in the Federal Register.
To recoup consolidation costs, defense companies must prove that the
Government received savings in the form of reduced costs. In April 1 993 a Government
Accounting Office's (GAO) report found that this reimbursement policy has saved the
Pentagon two dollars for every dollar it has spent. [Ref. 18:p. A 15] Former Under
Secretary of Defense (A&T) Kaminiski claimed that DOD reaped $3.95 billion in savings
from efficiencies resulting from industry mergers. [Ref. 7:p. 21 1]
Figure 2.4 illustrates the mergers and consolidations. The dates and dollar values








































Source: Developed by the researcher.
Figure 2.4. Mergers and Consolidations in the Defense Industry 1990-1998
G. ANTI-TRUST IMPLICATIONS
Defense Secretary William Perry stated "We look at the proposed merger from
the point of view of whether they are detrimental to our ability to maintain a
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competitive defense industry, and if and when that happens, we'll speak out to the Justice
Department. So far, however, that hasn't happened," [Ref. 7:p. 213] Perry's successor,
William Cohen, is not as supportive of the consolidation as his predecessor. Meetings
with Lockheed were held with both the Justice and Defense Departments in March 1998.
After the meetings Lockheed stated that the Government was "fundamentally opposed"
to its planned purchase of Northrop Grumman. [Ref. 16:p. 1]
H. TRADITIONAL MARKET SYSTEM
The ability of Congress to control what the end user receives whether the user
wants it or not is a unique feature of the defense market. This differentiates DoD
acquisition from the traditional market system.
In a traditional market place the seller of a product takes initiative in developing
and producing a product. Funding required for development is obtained from retained
earnings or through debt or equity financing. Buyers then decide to purchase the new
product or one offered by a competitor. The market is the interaction between the buyer
and seller. First, if a product does poorly against a competitor, the seller will use this
information to lower prices, improve the product, or discontinue it. Second, the market
serves as a reward and punishment system. Producers who anticipate consumer needs
ahead of the competition and are efficient at keeping costs down will receive an above-
average return. A producer neglecting to adapt to consumer desires or with poor cost
control makes below-average profits or losses and may eventually be driven from the
market. "Prices are determined by competition, not by costs incurred or determination of
a fair level of profit." [Ref. 19:p. 55]
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Competition between sellers ensures a reasonable price for the buyers. If profits
increase, other sellers may be lured to enter the market. Decreases in profits may force
some sellers out of the market in a search of greater return on their capital.
I. FREE MARKET VS. THE MARKET FOR WEAPON SYSTEMS
In a general sense the defense market is like any other market: it brings together
buyers and sellers. The DoD and foreign Governments demand defense-related
equipment and domestic and foreign industries supply the equipment. The parties are
brought together through a legally binding contract by which the supplier, in return for a
good or service, receives payment.
The market for a weapon system differs from the traditional free market. In the
weapons market, the buyer decides what he wants developed. The buyer rather than the
seller usually finances weapons. This is accomplished through cost invoices, loan
guarantees, or advance payments. The buyer can also supply Government-owned
property or Government-owned equipment to further reduce the investment required by
the seller. Competition between sellers is not always based on price. During the early
stages of a weapon acquisition program, competition may be centered on performance
while cost may be a secondary concern.
The weapons acquisition market differs in how price is resolved. In a cost-plus
contract, the price is ascertained by- determining costs and then adding a "fair and
reasonable" fee (profit).
Even in a negotiated fixed-price arrangement, sellers may have to certify cost data
as current, accurate, and complete. The buyer then adds profit to anticipated or
negotiated target costs.
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Through market research firms can estimate demand for their products and plan
accordingly. The cancellation of a product line is usually an internal corporate decision.
In contrast, the market for weapons is subject to annual changes in the budget that may
increase, decrease, or eliminate a program due to a policy change.
In his 1989 book, "Affording Defense" Jacques Gansler listed several areas where
the weapons market and free market theory were different.
Table 2.1 gives Gansler' s view of the practices in the defense market compared
with the tenets of free market theory.
Table 2.1. Comparing Practices in the Defense Market Against Tenets
of Free-market Theory [Ref. ll:p. 159]
Free Market Theory Defense Market Practice
Many small buyers One buyer
Many small suppliers Very few large suppliers
All items are small, and bought in large
quantities
Each item is extremely expensive, and
bought in very small quantities
Market sets prices Monopoly or oligopoly pricing - or "buy
in" to "available budget dollars"
Free movement in and out of market Extensive barriers to entry and exit
Prices are set by marginal costs Prices are proportional to costs
Prices are set by marginal utility Almost any price is paid for desired
military performance
Prices fall with reduced demand to
encourage buying more
Prices rise with reduced demand, owing to
cost based pricing
Supply adjusts to demand Large excess capacity
Labor is highly mobile Greatly diminishing labor mobility
Decreasing or constant returns to scale
1
(operating difficulty)
Increasing returns to scale (in region of
interest)
Market shifts rapidly with changes in
supply and demand
7-10 years to develop a new system, then at
least 3-5 years to produce it
Market smoothly reaches equilibrium Erratic budget behavior year to year
General equilibrium - assumes prices will
J
return to equilibrium value
Costs have been rising at 5-7 percent per
year excluding inflation
Profits are equalized across economy Wide profit variations between sectors;
even wider between firms
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Table 2.1 (Continued)
Free Market Theory Defense Market Practice
Perfect mobility of capital (money) Difficulty in borrowing
Capital (equipment) is mobile with
changing demand
Large and old capital equipment "locks in"
companies
No Government involvement Government is regulator, specifier, banker,
judge of claims etc.
Selection is based on price Selection is based on promised
performance
No externalities All businesses working for DOD must
satisfy requirements of OSHA, EEO,
awards to areas of high unemployment,
small business set asides, etc.
Profits are a return for risks Profits are regulated, primarily as a percent
of costs
All products of a given type are the same Essentially each producer's products are
different
Competition is for share of the market Competition is often for all or none of a
market
Production is for inventory Production occurs after a sale is made
Size of market is established by buyers and
sellers
Size of market is established by "third
party" (Congress) through annual budget
Demand is sensitive to price Demand is "threat sensitive," or responds
to availability of new technology; it is
almost never price sensitive
Technology is equal throughout and
industry
Competitive technologies
Relatively stable multi-year commitments Annual commitments, with frequent
changes
Benefits of the purchase go to the buyer A "public good"
Buyer has a choice of spending now or
saving for a later time
DOD must spend its congressional
appropriation or lose it
Gansler's free market theory may confuse the term "free market" with commodity
market in the table above. A more effective comparison would be between defense
market practices and industrial market practices. In this case the markets are not as
different as under Gansler's approach.
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1. Number of Buyers
In the automobile industry, for example, there may be only one buyer for
automobile bodies by Fisher Corp: General Motors. Many other companies sell
exclusively to one buyer.
2. Barrier to Entry
The movement in and out of the defense industry may not be any more difficult
than moving in and out of the industrial market. If barrier to entry is defined as a legal
impediment to enter the industry, such as exists in local telecommunications markets,
then there is no barrier to enter the defense market. If barrier is defined as economies of
scale required to start production, then the same barriers exist for the automobile industry
that exist for the defense industry.
3. Pricing
Pricing practices are also more similar between industrial markets and the
weapons market. Procurement professionals now treat cost as an independent variable,
trading off performance to obtain a better overall price. On the industrial market side
prices are not set by marginal costs but by what the market will bear.
4. Mobility of Labor
The mobility of labor in the defense market may be equal to or greater than
mobility in the free market. Fully one-fourth of the scientists and engineers involved in
R&D move back and forth between civilian and defense work in a four-year period.
[Ref. 20] Conversely, laborers in the auto industry enter into collective bargaining
agreements where seniority matters most— a great disincentive for mobility.
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5. Government Involvement
There is also extensive Government involvement in the automobile manufacturing
industry. Requirements for airbags, fuel economy, and emission standards are a few
regulations unique to this particular industry. The breadth and extent of the regulations
may not be as great but, like all regulations, they modify behavior of the regulated party.
The fuel-efficiency requirement, for example, encourages manufacturers to sell lighter
and more dangerous vehicles on the market.
6. Production
Production for automobiles is primarily for inventory. However, consumers may
request a range of options such as CD players, leather interiors, or special paint that will
require modifications after initial production or delivery to the dealer.
J. CONTRACTING
Methods of contracting in the weapons market differ from those in the
commercial market. In research and development contracts for weapons the product or
task cannot be specified in detail and there are significant risks that cannot be identified.
These risks are referred to as "unknown unknowns." The Government and a defense
contractor will use a "cost-plus" contract in which a contractor is paid on the basis of cost
incurred. The contract is for a "level of effort" rather than a particular product. A
company entering a cost-plus contract must have a Government-approved cost
accounting system.
The commercial market usually operates with fixed-price contracts. The costs
and risks are known and the product or service can be clearly specified. The Government
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will also use a fixed-price contract when a weapon system enters into production and
risks are easier to define.
Table 2.2 shows the differences between traditional contracts and weapons
procurement contracts according to Ganlser.
Table 2.2. Gansler's View of Traditional Business Contracts
Contrasted with Weapons Procurement Contracts
[Ref. ll:p. 162]
Traditional Contracts Weapons Procurement Contracts
Fixed Scope (in terms of specifications,
cost, performance, schedule, and
quantities)
Constantly changing scope (in terms of
specifications, budgets, desired
performance, quantities and schedule)
"Arms-length relationship" Involvement in every step of the process
A Change terminates or fundamentally
alters the contract
Changes are treated as administrative
matters, and appropriate adjustments are
made to the contract
Results are easily measured, and blame is
placeable
Results are hard to identify and measure.
Placing blame is difficult because of the
strong relationship [ between buyer and
seller]
What is bought is, basically, a product Contract is as much for the service of
producing the system as it is for the
product itself(again reflecting detailed
Government involvement)
Short term Long term (often decades)
Disputes are litigated Disputes are resolved by adjustments that
preserve contractual relations
K. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter provided three diverse topics. However, all of these topics are
relevant and necessary to provide the reader with requisite knowledge. The first topic
was the definition of the defense industrial base and its components. Maintaining a
defense industrial base has costs as well as benefits. The benefits are self-sufficiency,
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leverage, economic, and insulation from vulnerability to foreign sources. The costs are
paying for excess capacity in peacetime, use of sole-source domestic suppliers when
available foreign sources may be cheaper, and purchase of unnecessary equipment to
keep production lines warm.
The second part of the chapter provided an overview of the declining overall
defense and defense procurement budget with the latter now representing less than 20
percent of the former. The resulting decline in procurement spending, a 67 percent drop
since 1985, has resulted in many defense firms merging or acquiring other firms. The
consolidation of the defense industry was an effort by firms to eliminate excess capacity
and become more efficient. The DoD encouraged and supported the mergers in order to
benefit from the cost savings. In the Spring of 1998, DoD, was extremely concerned
about a loss of competition in the industry, and no longer encouraged further
consolidation. As a result of this fear, DoD sought to block the proposed merger of
Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman.
The final section of this chapter presented Gansler's view of the differences
between the traditional defense market and the free market. The researcher provided an
analysis of the differences described by Gansler. Lastly, the final section presented
Gansler's view of the differences between commercial and defense contracts.
Chapter III describes civil-military integration of the industrial base as a means of




A. DEFINITION OF CIVIL-MILITARY INTEGRATION
In one of his first speeches delivered after confirmation as the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Dr. Jacques Gansler stated:
While the many mergers and acquisitions have been both necessary and
desirable, there is a growing concern that we may end up with only sole-
source producers in critical defense sectors - thus eliminating the
innovation, cost, and responsiveness benefits of competition. A solution
likely lies in a broadening of the defense industrial base to include
commercial firms. [Ref. 21 :p. 9]
The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) defines civil-military integration as
the process of merging the Defense Technology and Industrial Base (DTIB) and the
larger Commercial Technology and Industrial Base (CTIB) into a unified National
Technology and Industrial Base.
B. MEANS OF ACHIEVING CIVIL-MILITARY INTEGRATION
Civil-Military Integration (CMI) can occur through conversion of existing defense
plants to commercial products, diversification of defense companies into commercial
product lines, or dual-use technology where a single production line can produce both
civilian and military components.
1. Conversion of Existing Defense Industries to Commercial Production
With the dramatic downsizing, defense conversion is seen as a way to avoid
layoffs, plant closings, and business failures. In his 1992 paper "Converting the Defense
Industry" Voss defined conversion as:
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The conversion of military capacity to civilian capacity. It implies that the
company stops making some military products and changes over to
civilian ones. People who were working on military projects then work on
civil ones and factory facilities that were being used for military products
are turned over to the civil workforce. [Ref. 22:p. 1]
2. Diversification
Diversification refers to a defense firm acquiring a commercial firm or starting a
new commercial product line. It is an effort by a firm to reduce reliance on one particular
market or customer. [Ref. 23 :p. 91] "When defense contractors have successfully
diversified, rarely has the source of competitive advantage rested on technology
transferred from the military side of the business." [Ref. 24 :p. A 12]
3. Dual-Use
Experience has shown that most defense firms cannot convert from the high-
overhead, "cost-plus" culture to compete in commercial markets. Another strategy for
CMI is dual-use technologies. A key to pursuing dual-use technology was the passage of
the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) in 1994. FASA makes it easier to buy
commercial products and services. On February 24, 1994, Secretary of Defense Perry
released "Acquisition Reform: A Mandate for Change." The Military Services were
directed to "use performance and commercial specifications and standards instead of
military specifications and standards." This was a reversal of the long-standing policy,
which relied upon the use of military specifications and standards (MILSPECS) - the
31,000 specifications and standards that detail how military items are to be manufactured
and tested. Dual-use technology refers to finding products or services that can have both
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military and commercial applications. It is a two-way program to help defense firms
enter the commercial market and commercial firms enter the defense market. Dual-use
technology is defined in 10 U.S.C. 2491:
Dual-use with respect to product services, standards, processes, or
acquisition practices means products, services, standards processes, or
acquisition practices that are capable of meeting requirements for military
and non-military application.
C. JUSTIFICATION FOR AN INTEGRATED INDUSTRIAL BASE
According to the report "Second to None: Preserving America's Military
Advantage Through Dual-Use Technology" prepared by the National Economic Council
(NEC), an industrial base segregated into a defense sector and commercial sector is no
longer appropriate for the following reasons:
1. Affordability
With the reduced budget it is no longer economically viable to have a completely
separate military and commercial base. By integrating the two industrial bases DoD can
exploit the market-driven efficiencies of the commercial sector. The inclusion of
traditional commercial firms may help offset any loss of competition resulting from the
defense mergers.
2. Access to Leading-Edge Technology
The defense industry is no longer in the position of technological leadership over
the commercial sector. Technologies most needed to support the revolution in military
affairs such as computers, semiconductors, telecommunications and advanced materials
are being advanced by commercial demand, not military demand. CMI will allow the
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Pentagon to take advantage of the rapid pace of innovation and efficiencies of the
commercial sector.
3. Ability to Rebuild
A smaller defense-only industrial base may not have the capacity to quickly
respond to a crisis. With CMI the manufacturing capacity of the entire nation could be
used without a lengthy process of retooling and build-up.
D. OBJECTIVES OF AN INTEGRATED INDUSTRIAL BASE
The objectives of civil-military integration are to shorten weapon system
development time, reduce costs, and maintain capacity to respond quickly to a crisis.
These objectives are summarized as follows:
• Shorten weapon system development time and increase the pace at which
technological improvements are incorporated into new military systems.
This goal can be accomplished by introducing the commercial sector's
continuous stream of updated technology during development, production
and deployment phases.
• Reduce costs for procuring leading-edge technology. Commercial
components, technologies and subsystems can, in many instances, be
incorporated into military systems to meet the functional requirements at
lower cost than technology that is uniquely developed from scratch for a
specific military customer.
• Permit DoD to maintain its ability to respond to national security
contingencies. Close integration with the private sector is imperative if
the nation is to be equipped to gear up its industrial capabilities quickly to
meet the military demands of a crisis. [Ref. 25]
E. STRATEGY TO ACHIEVE OBJECTIVES
The Pentagon built upon acquisition reform, with a goal to make the acquisition
process more businesslike, by pursuing the dual-use strategy. Dual-use is accomplished
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through: (1) support for research and development (R&D), (2) integration of defense and
commercial products and (3) insertion of commercial technologies in development,
production and support of military systems. [Ref. 26]
1. Support for Research and Development
The Pentagon funds dual-use R&D to take advantage of advanced commercial
techniques through the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).
DARPA targets investments in areas such as computer hardware, software, electronics
and simulation that have defense applications as well as commercial applications.
In 1993, the Technology Reinvestment Project (TRP) was established with an
investment of $440 million. It allowed DARPA to match each TRP dollar with a
contributor's dollar. This cost-sharing arrangement gave DoD access to commercial
research with minimal investment. According to Robert Hertzfeld, Acting Director of the
Dual-Use and Commercial Program Office in the Pentagon, "The funding gives DoD
leverage. By using a cost-sharing arrangement the DoD benefits from all the technology
the firm brings to the project." [Ref. 27] For example, if a firm has already spent $100
million on a given technology that DoD is interested in and for which there may be a
military application, then DoD and the company may split the cost of developing the
military application. If the cost to develop the military application is $20 million and
DoD pays a $10-million share, then it has leveraged $10 million into $120 million worth
of research by pursuing a commercial technology.
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Table 3.1. Demonstration of Leverage
Funds previously spent on research by commercial firm: $100
DoD share of development for military use: $ 10
Commercial firm share for military use: $ 10
Total spent on technology: $120
The following are examples of Dual-use R&D
Low-cost night vision systems.
Use of commercial research and technology made infrared sensors one-tenth the
cost of their MILSPEC counterparts. [Ref. 28]
Battlefield casualty treatment
Sensors and information systems placed in uniforms can improve ability to
diagnose and treat injured personnel. [Ref. 29] Information can be relayed immediately
after the injury from the field to a medical facility staffed with specialists.
Composite materials.
The use of materials lighter than metal yet stronger will increase the performance
and range of aircraft. Brunswick, best known for its bowling balls, also makes composite
materials for aircraft radar domes and pressure vessels for space.
2. Integration of Defense and Commercial Production
Integration of defense and commercial production can be accomplished in either
of two ways. First, a commercial application for defense technologies can be found to
make production more affordable through economies of scale. Second, flexible
manufacturing can be promoted so custom military products can be produced on the same
assembly line as commercial products with minimal retooling. Flexible manufacturing
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refers to the ability of a firm to manufacture different items off the same assembly line
with a minimal number of changes or retooling. The following are examples of defense
and commercial production:
Global Positioning Systems (GPS).
GPS was designed to help the military locate targets or allow military units to
determine their precise location by the use of satellites in geosynchronous orbit. A
commercial use was developed for merchant ships and commercial aircraft. During
Desert Storm the Army required a large number of global positioning systems. The
MILSPEC receiver cost $34,000, weighed 17 pounds and would have taken 18 months to
procure. An acceptable commercial GPS weighing three pounds was purchased for
$1,300. The cost of the commercial unit is now $800. [Ref. 28:p. 12]
Circuit Boardsfor F-22 Aircraft
TRW manufactures circuit boards for the F-22 stealth fighter on the same high-
volume production line as the circuit boards for commercial trucks. The challenge in the
flexible manufacture of these circuit boards is not switching from commercial to military
production, but working around the traditional contracting process in order to accomplish
the change. [Ref. 28]
HS601 Satellite.
Another example of integrated production is Hughes Aircraft. For the HS601
satellite Hughes set up three separate program offices, one each for the DOD, National
Air and Space Administration (NASA), and commercial customers. However at the
engineering and manufacturing divisions, interchangeability and commonality among
31
projects is emphasized. Manpower at these two divisions is interchangeable among the
three programs. The satellites had common propulsion, power systems, altitude control
sensors, digital computers and structural members. "All the spacecraft were built by the
same standard, independent of customer, contracting method, and level of in-plant
inspection." [Ref. 30] The power demands of the radio subsystems for each customer
were different so the HS601 can be expanded off the existing structure, similar to adding
LEGO™ blocks to each other. The military configuration requires additional solar panels
and plates for batteries while the commercial customer may elect not to add additional
panels or plates. The HS601 was sold to Australia for mobile communication service and
direct TV broadcast service while the second unit manufactured was sold to the U.S.
Navy for tactical communications among air, sea, and land forces. [Ref. 31]
3. Insertion of Commercial Technologies and Products into Military
Systems
Although FASA eliminated regulatory barriers to buying commercial items, the
risk of departing from MILSPECS must be considered. Commercial products must be
able to perform in a military environment that may be more stressful on the component or
system than a commercial environment. If the risk is low and substitution possible, then
commercial units will generally be less expensive. "Ultimately, successful insertion
requires that a weapon system be designed from the outset to incorporate commercial
rather than defense-unique materials, technologies, and components, with cost and
manufacturing treated as key considerations." [Ref. 28]
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F. METHODS OF ACHIEVING COMMERCIAL MILITARY INTEGRA-
TION
There are three initiatives for achieving commercial military integration: Dual-
Use Science and Technology, (Dual-Use S&T), the Commercial Technology Insertion
Program (CTIP), and the Commercial Operating and Support Savings Initiative. (COS SI)
1. Dual-Use S&T
Dual-Use S&T is primarily accomplished using a tool called "Other Transactions
Authority (OTA)." In 1990, Congress authorized a $50 million appropriation under 10
U.S.C. 2371, Section 845 of Public Law 103-160, Other Transactions Authority (OTA),
for DARPA to fund dual-use programs for certain prototype projects, to the military
departments and other designated officials. This new statutory authority provides relief
from most procurement regulations such as the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR),
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), or other laws and
regulations specific to the procurement process. Statutes of general applicability such as
equal opportunity, Vietnam Veterans and handicapped workers, however are applicable.
DoD designated the defense agencies as authorized users of this authority.
Under OTA, DARPA may enter into other transactions with any "person, agency
or instrumentality of the U.S., unit of state or local Government, educational institution,
and any other entity." [Ref. 32 :p. 34] The advantage of using OTAs is the regulatory
relief provided. OTAs enable the Government to negotiate terms and conditions of a
business arrangement unconstrained by rules and forms that are unique to Government.
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The Government may also enter into agreements with consortiums of several companies,
which would not be allowed under existing procurement regulations.
2. Commercial Technology Insertion Program (CTIP)- Reducing
Operation and Support Costs
Commercial Technology Insertion takes advantage of new commercial
technologies that are available while a weapon system is in the development or upgrade
stage. The use of rapidly developing commercial technologies should improve the
performance, affordability, and delivery schedule of weapon systems at this stage of the
acquisition cycle. As a weapon system moves closer to production, changes become
risky and program managers may not wish to jeopardize the production schedule.
CTIP therefore is targeted at introducing new technologies during the Engineering
and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase of an acquisition program.
3. Commercial Operations and Support Savings Initiative (COSSI)
About 65-70 percent of the life cycle cost of a major weapon system is incurred
after the system is fielded. [Ref. 33] As systems age, operation and maintenance (O&M)
costs tend to grow. With the funding for defense spending remaining steady, a key to
modernization is to reduce O&M costs.
The Commercial Operations and Support Savings Initiative (COSSI) is an attempt
to reduce O&M costs by developing repair and upgrade kits and incorporating
technological upgrades that occur as the system ages and inserting those kits in fielded
systems. It utilizes OTA for the first stage and standard procurement practices for the
second.
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COSSI is a two step process. In Stage I, DoD and a firm or consortium
enters into a cost sharing arrangement to develop and qualify a prototype
repair or upgrade kit. Cost sharing provides assurance that the industry
partner is committed to the project and believes in the viability of the
outcome. Stage II is implemented where Stage I has been successful. In
Stage II, the military customer can use normal procurement procedures to
purchase production quantities of kits. [Ref. 33]
COSSI was implemented in FY 1997. After the first year of the program, eighty-
one proposals were evaluated and thirty were selected for Stage I funding. The
Government share of the funding was $91 million, with the commercial firms
contributing $97 million. According to Secretary of Defense Cohen, if all thirty Stage I
projects proceed to Stage II, the net present value of O&M savings these projects are
expected to generate over a ten-year period is approximately $3 billion.
COSSI does have some problems. Funding for COSSI in FY 1998 was provided
only incrementally to existing programs and new programs will not be started until
funding becomes available in FY 1999. Another characteristic of COSSI is that
companies that participate in Stage I are treated as "sole source" bidders when they enter
Stage II and use normal procurement procedures. At this stage all FAR clauses apply and
a directive will have to be issued authorizing "less than adequate competition" for the
Stage II request for proposal. [Ref. 34]
The three programs established for achieving CMI are: dual-use S&T, CTIP, and
COSSI. Dual-use S&T uses OTA and takes place in the research phase of an acquisition
program. Once an acquisition program is in the development stage the CTIP hopes to
improve cost, performance, and schedule. When a weapon system is in production or
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fielded, the commercial operations and support savings initiative is used to develop
upgrade and repair kits to insert in fielded systems. The primary goal of COS SI is to
reduce operations and maintenance costs. Figure 3.1 illustrates the various initiatives
discussed and the acquisition milestone in which they will be used. The milestones are




















Acquisition Milestone II III
Figure 3.1. Current Initiatives Promoting Civil-Military Integration
[Ref. 35]
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter defined CMI as the process of merging the Defense Industrial Base
to the Commercial Industrial Base. Conversion, diversification and dual-use initiatives
are the means of achieving CMI. The justification and objectives for an integrated
industrial base are affordability, access to leading edge technology, and ability to meet
surge requirements in emergencies. The strategies to achieve the objectives of CMI are:
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support for R&D, integration of defense and commercial production, and insertion of
commercial technologies and products into the military systems. Currently DoD is using
several methods for implementing the strategies. The first, Dual-use S&T, is targeted at
research early in the acquisition process. Second, the commercial technology insertion
program places commercial components into a weapon system during the development
stage. The third method is the commercial operations and support savings initiative. The
commercial operations and support savings initiative is a two-stage process geared to
insertion of repair or upgrade kits to fielded systems. It uses OTAs for the first stage and
standard procurement methods for the second.
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IV. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF CMI
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the advantages and disadvantages of pursuing CMI. Both
the positive and negative aspects are presented whether they were found at the policy
level of determining who will benefit from CMI, or the end-user level in discussing
product support and reliability.
B. NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF CIVIL-MILITARY INTEGRATION
1. Defense Cuts and Conversion Markets
Defense conversion appears as a win-win situation. The technology base of
defense suppliers is sophisticated and helping the defense suppliers convert to
commercial enterprises should therefore help the overall economy. However the facts
say otherwise. "The markets for typical conversion products - like wind shear detectors
and night vision equipment - are minuscule compared with the Pentagon's former
defense needs." [Ref. 24] In other areas such as data services and electronic controls the
defense-based technology is not new and established competitors already exist. As a
result most attempts at conversion are not successful.
2. History of Failure
The history of defense firms converting to or entering the commercial market is
one marked by failure. The inability of many defense firms to enter the commercial
market was caused by unfamiliarity with commercial work, concurrency (concurrency is
the simultaneous and integrated engineering of all design, manufacturing and support
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aspects of a product from concept through availability [Ref. 36:p. 18]), and inaccurate
market expectations.
In the case of developing light rail vehicles for urban mass transit, Boeing
underestimated difficulties present, and agreed to compressed delivery schedules. The
schedule, coupled with penalties for late delivery, forced Boeing to meet milestones
through concurrency - modifying the cars on the production line. [Ref. 23 :p. 103] This
resulted in 65 design modifications within the first year of operation. At the end of the
second year, only 39 of 175 rail cars delivered were in revenue service. [Ref. 23 :p. 104]
Boeing officials admitted concurrency was a mistake and that the problems may have
been avoided had they shut down production, paid the scheduling penalties, and
completed design modifications prior to moving into full production. [Ref. 23 :p. 103]
Although many firms such as Boeing have both commercial and military product
lines, their defense business is usually separated from the commercial business
geographically, financially, and technically. "The only link between their defense and
commercial sectors, literally two distinct businesses, is that they both report to the same
corporate headquarters." [Ref. 37:p. 243] The successful companies segregate the
commercial operations, design, procurement, manufacturing, service, marketing, and
sales from similar Government divisions to avoid mixing the two businesses even if the
products are related. [Ref. 24 :p. A 12]
The list below summarizes the unsuccessful attempts at defense conversion or
diversification:
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Boeing - buses and electric trains for urban mass transit.
Avco (now a part of Textron) - filmmaking, motor-home construction and
VCR production.
Grumman - buses, yachts, and solar panels.
Northrop - pollution controls, nuclear-plant equipment, medical and
business data services, and airport development.
McDonnell-Douglas - microelectronic controls, medical systems, real
estate and coal conversion.
Martin Marietta - energy and environmental services.
Raytheon - data terminals, television tubes, and semiconductors.
TRW - telecommunications.
General Dynamics - telecommunications.
Acurex - solar energy.
According to Lundquist any conversion ventures backed by Government funds
should be assessed on the small chance that they would be successful. The more
unfamiliar the market the higher the likelihood of failure. This results in many defense
contractors seeking overseas markets rather than converting or diversifying their
operations.
A common link among the failures was that the new markets were still closely
tied to the Government, in particular through Government goals such as increased mass
transit and use of alternative energy.
3. Determining Who Benefits
If the Government supports or subsidizes a dual-use initiative, one problem may
be identifying who will benefit the most. The military should initially benefit. Having a
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larger national industrial base (NIB), as opposed to a DIB, should create greater
competition and greater surge capabilities in time of conflict. Commercial or
traditionally non-defense related firms would also benefit by having an expanded market.
The greatest cost may come to the traditional defense contractors however. For
example, a traditional defense firm pursuing dual-use technologies may face restrictions
on which technology or product it is allowed to provide to the commercial market,
especially items that could be exported and used by hostile nations. If the firm counted
on its potential revenues from commercial sales to help cover its development costs then
it may lose money on the dual-use venture. Additionally, traditional defense firms will
face increased competition from the commercial sector after operating in a somewhat
insulated market. Defense contractors' competitors are already familiar with marketing
in both the domestic and international market. This increased competition will exist in a
shrinking defense market, further exacerbating the problem for traditional defense
contractors.
The Government dual-use programs will in the short run, hurt the firms
they were designed to help. In the long run (for those that survive),
defense firms will be far stronger and more competitive in the converging
defense and commercial markets. [Ref. 37:p. 240]
4. Standardization
Military specifications do have advantages over the use of commercial items. They
enable several different manufacturers to produce an item that is interchangeable with an
item from another manufacturer. Another reason cited for use of MILSPECS is that
specifying a brand name for an item may appear to restrict competition; however, any item
that meets the MILSPEC is acceptable. Buyers are then assured of functionality, regardless
of the source selected. [Ref. 38:p. 46]
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The use of standards allows a contracting officer or contractor to narrow the area of
judgment for a product. [Ref. 39:p. 39] MILSPECS also provided designers a "pool of
standardized components" to choose from. [Ref. 38:p. 46]
In the commercial market, designers and manufactures continuously seek to
differentiate their products from other suppliers. The product can then be marketed as better
than the competitor's by being faster, lighter, smaller, cheaper or whatever a company
believes the market wants.
The Joint Electronic Device Engineering Committee (JEDEC) sets standards on
electronic components. Many firms will use JDEC criteria as their minimum criteria and
then deviate from that. For example, in the integrated circuit there is a JEDEC criteria for
transistor-transistor logic (TTL) called the 74 series. The 74 series now comes with 74, 74C,
74H, 74HC, 74AHC, 74S, 74LS, 74ALS, 74F, 74ABT, 74LV, 74LVC, 74LVT, and
74ALVC. "Common logic families are now filled with so many variations that procurement
has been seriously compromised." [Ref. 38:p. 46]
5. Product Support
Product support for the Defense Department can be reduced under civil-military
integration. According to Dr. Gary Gaugler, a senior engineer at the Defense
Microelectronics Activity (DMEA), many chipmakers have stopped producing
semiconductors for military customers. As a result several designs suddenly lost their
spare parts and production parts streams. For example, on the F-22 the electronic
prototype systems built for initial demonstration cannot be produced. The original
microelectronic components made by LSI Logic, Milipitas, CA are no longer available.
LSI Logic discontinued all military gate array business. As a result the designs made by
the prime contractors for avionics in the avionics systems are no longer available. They
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will have to be redesigned, re-hosted, re-manufactured, re-tested, and re-qualified. [Ref.
40]
A second issue also involving the F-22 is that the electronic system was built
around a 5-volt power supply standard. Nineteen Ninety Eight marks the first year that 5-
volt devices are less than 50% of the total production of microelectronic devices. One
hundred percent of military systems run on 5 or higher volt systems. Commercial
systems by contrast run on 3.3 or 2.7 volts of electricity. The percentage operating at 5
volts will go down exponentially over time. [Ref. 40] Higher speed, higher density and
lower unit cost dictate the use of smaller microelectronic devices. "As the industry
moves towards 0.35, 0.25 micron and smaller devices, the operating voltages move
correspondingly lower." [Ref. 40] Lloyd Peters, a senior analyst with SRI International,
believes that "the military needs to focus on system architectures so that electronic
systems can be upgraded as better components are developed instead of focusing on
individual pieces of equipment and being forced to make obsolete parts." [Ref. 41]
6. Reliability
There is a common perception that commercial items will not withstand the rigors
of military use. Whereas commercial semiconductors are made to function at
temperatures from 32 degrees Fahrenheit to 158 degrees Fahrenheit, military electronic
components are designed to operate at temperatures ranging from minus 67 degrees
Fahrenheit to 257 degrees Fahrenheit. [Ref. 40] The temperature inside a weapon-
system platform at approximately 80,000 feet could reach —40F while in a container in
the desert may reach 170F. At forward air bases such as Elmendorf AFB in Alaska,
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aircraft would have to remain in climate-controlled hangars or aircrews would have to
wait while the avionics reached a certain operational temperature window.
An example cited by opponents of CMI is a MILSPEC fax machine designed and
manufactured for the Air Force that "withstood blowing sand and kept transmitting target
imagery while the cases melted off its commercial counterparts in the desert heat." [Ref.
42] Sutton described the fax machine example as proving the rule by citing the
exception. Dr. Gaugler counters that if you have a hypothesis that commercial products
can work or be integrated in military weapons platforms you only need one exception to
disprove the hypothesis.
The reliability issue is addressed during test and evaluation. "Program Managers
will test a commercial component in a platform under the same conditions that the
platform would be operating in. Until a component completes the formal test and
evaluation process a Program Manager would consider it untried and untested." [Ref. 43]
If commercial items and MILSPEC items are subjected to the same tests and pass, there
is no reason to believe that a MILSPEC item is more reliable.
7. Reliance on Foreign Sources
High-tech markets cross national boundaries. In 1970, 95 % of high-tech
products purchased by Americans were made in the United States; by 1986, this fraction
had fallen to 82%. [Ref. 31] High-tech is defined as any technology requiring the most
sophisticated scientific equipment and advanced engineering techniques. [Ref. 44]
Heavier reliance on commercial products could therefore result in increasing dependence
on foreign products.
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Current policy at the DoD Office of Industrial Affairs is that-foreign sourcing or
dependency on foreign sources is not a problem. The DoD recognizes that it operates in
a global marketplace. "The Pentagon asks the question 'Will it meet our needs?' We
[the Pentagon] are indifferent to who manufactures what." [Ref. 45] Dependency is
different from vulnerability. The Pentagon Office of Industrial Affairs and Capabilities
focuses more on vulnerabilities to interrupted supply than in monitoring the total amount
of material obtained from offshore suppliers.
8. Technology Transfer
One of the major disadvantages of civil-military integration is the loss of controls
over technology. With commercial technology advancing faster than military-unique
technology, other countries can obtain state-of-the-art systems and components and insert
them into military platforms.
On one side of the issue are the contractors who want fewer restrictions on
exporting items such as satellites. However, exporting satellites with dual-use
technology may violate laws concerning the exportation of technology with military
applications.
In a recent case President Clinton, after being lobbied by the industry officials,
approved the export of a Loral satellite. The Pentagon found that the reliability of
China's nuclear missiles was advanced after American scientists provided expertise on
how to put a commercial satellite in orbit. "The technology needed to put a commercial
satellite in orbit is similar to that which guides a long-range nuclear missile to its target."
[Ref. 46]
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The technology can be difficult to control. Makers of these^ highly specialized
systems no longer have a large domestic customer to sell to and increasingly must turn to
the global market. The smaller defense market benefits as well from the economies of
scale. If a country, such as China, is considered friendly, then the controls are less
restrictive. The weakness is in the fact that once the technology is transferred to a
friendly nation it in turn can provide the technology to a hostile country. For example,
China, a country receiving "most-favored-nation" trade status, has sold missile
technology to Iran.
U.S. law requires foreign purchasers of firearms to sign a statement that arms will
not be re-exported to another country without the authorization of the State Department.
However, even friendly trading partners such as those in the European Union believe that
"re-export restrictions are an infringement on territorial sovereignty." [Ref. 47] Under
European Union law there is no requirement that a company wishing to re-export goods,
military or commercial, to another member country notify the export licensing authority
in the original country. [Ref. 47]
The current administration believes that economic security is an integral part of
national security and supports many of the high-tech exports. At former Secretary of
Defense William Perry's confirmation hearing on Feb 24, 1993, Perry said that
controlling the sale of dual-use technology "was a hopeless task, and that it only
interferes with a company's ability to succeed internationally if we try to impose all sorts
of controls in that area." [Ref. 48]
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9. Training Acquisition Personnel
Acquisition professionals have been trained to perform in a unique procurement
environment. "Training costs may rise as a result of the elimination of the established
military specification and standards system." [Ref. 25 :p. 31] After years of learning the
importance of MILSPECS, quality assurance, cost accounting, and risks of fraud it will
be difficult to tell them that commercial practices are acceptable and may be better.
10. Quality Assurance
With integration lower-quality products may find their way into the supply
system. A system failing in combat may have fatal consequences. (However even with
MILSPECS this risk remains. Some MILSPEC items are commercial products
downgraded as the commercial standards are higher).
11. Fraud and Abuse
The DoD Inspector General, Eleanor Hill, fears that eliminating requirements for
cost and pricing data and cost accounting standards may result in greater fraud and abuse.
[Ref. 49:p. 28]
12. Technical Data Rights
In most cases, DoD requires its suppliers to provide technical drawings and data
that may be provided to a seller's competitors to promote competition. In contrast,
commercial firms protect their proprietary information closely. Any dual-use
arrangement will have to address limitations on the Government's rights to technical data
and safeguards to prevent the release or unauthorized use of proprietary data.
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13. Socioeconomic Programs
One of the purposes of Government procurement is to promote socioeconomic
goals such as providing set asides for small disadvantaged businesses, restricting sources,
and directing contracts to labor surplus areas. The less control or leverage the
Government has over an industry, the less influence it has in promoting these goals.
Commercial firms may decline to set aside a percentage of their subcontracts for "small
disadvantaged businesses" in order to win Government business especially if the
Government business is not vital to its profitability.
14. Leverage
The DoD is no longer the dominant customer for most high-technology firms. As
the commercial market for semiconductor swells, DoD becomes a diminishing force in
the market. Now the U.S. Government represents about one percent of the total
semiconductor market, and has less influence on an industry's research effort. [Ref. 41]
"Restructuring the DIB to take maximum advantage of CMI may gain economic
efficiency at the price of technological superiority." [Ref. 25 :p. 41]
C. BENEFITS OF CMI
1. Administrative Costs
A study conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
examined real-world cases to try to quantitatively determine potential savings through
civil-military integration. The study examined a company with annual commercial sales
of $10 billion and defense sales of $4 billion; the total workforce of the company was
100,000 employees. The CSIS study found that 8,500 employees were needed to
administer the commercial sales and 18,200 to administer the defense sales. If the
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commercial ratio of employees to dollar of sales was applied to the defense sales it would
result in a savings of approximately $750 million out of the $4 billion in annual sales.
These savings were only in direct labor. Correspondingly there would be savings
in reduced oversight from Government employees and reduced overhead. In the same
CSIS study IBM estimated that 26 percent of the cost of the avionics processors it builds
for the DoD resulted from defense-unique requirements that added no [performance]
value to the final product. Buying commercial items results in lower prices because the
development costs of commercial items have been allocated to the expected commercial
market sales. [Ref. 50]
2. Direct Costs
The low volume for defense orders results in higher per unit cost. Commercial
components and technologies can meet the military's needs in many instances. These
commercial products and technologies can be provided cheaper than technology or
products custom developed for the military. [Ref. 43]
3. Reduced Time
Using existing technologies can reduce the time required to proceed through the
acquisition process. The technologies may already be proven and on the shelf. Time
savings are obtained through less development on Government time, less testing, no need
for unique Government training or technical manuals, and, if it is a purely commercial
item, less cost and price analysis. "Although DOD R&D programs deal with state-of-the-
art technologies, the pace at which technology actually moves into production trails well
behind the rapid rate of new product development by commercial industry." [Ref. 28 :p.
7]
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"Buying commercial items makes it possible to tap quickly into innovative
technologies developed for commercial sales, and it also provides the program/project
office with an assurance that the item will meet the specified performance standards
because it exists before contract award and can be observed and treated." [Ref. 50] A
Defense Science Board study found that systems built with commercial components
could be purchased in 20 to 50 percent of the time required for purchasing systems made
from unique military products. [Ref. 5 1 ]
4. Competition
By using the commercial market place, the Defense Department would obtain the
benefits of competition, innovation and lower prices. The commercial marketplace is
now considered more technologically innovative, and competitive markets are more
price-responsive than monopolies.
An example of using the threat of competition to the Government's advantage was
the C-17 program. The program had a history of delays, technical problems, and cost
overruns. "The Government had dozens of auditors pouring over records at the prime
contractor, McDonnell Douglas, in an effort to get a handle on the program." [Ref. 52]
The Air Force then threatened to take an offer from Boeing for a reconfigured but less
expensive Boeing 747. McDonnell-Douglas then found a way to get costs under control,
cutting the price of every C-17 by one-third, approximately $200 million per plane.
Competition is important for innovation as well as lower prices. "The Rand
Corporation found that the most important breakthroughs in military technology have not
come from the one or two companies that were incumbent contractors in a category, but
from 'wannabes' and upstart firms hoping to challenge them." [Ref. 52] The example
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cited in the report was the breakthroughs in stealth technology developed by Northrop
and Lockheed, which at the time did not have prime contracts for any Air Force fighters.
5. Technology Transfer
Military technology was once the leader in innovation. However, in the past
decade commercial firms have been considered the leaders in technological innovation.
Currently, more than 92 percent of research-oriented firms perform insignificant or no
Government research and development. [Ref. 53]
When the Annual Business Week R&D Scoreboard of the top 900 R&D
performing U.S. firms is compared to the Department of Defense report on the 500
largest R&D contractors, less than ten percent of the top 900 firms appear on the DoD
list. Of these, more than half are major defense contractors. [Ref. 53]
The following industries invest more than 5.3% of sales back into R&D:
computer communications, computers, data processing, disk and storage tape drives,
drugs, electronics, instruments, medical products, peripherals, semiconductors, software,
and systems. Not one of the top three firms in any of the twelve categories appeared on
the DoD list. [Ref. 53]
"Now instead of "spin-offs" from military technology, we are seeing "spin-ons"
where the military is looking to technologies from the more advanced private sector."
[Ref. 54] Recognizing this trend/opportunity, the USD (A&T), Jacques Gansler, is
investigating the use of fixed-price development contracts to entice non-traditional
defense contractors to bid on DoD contracts. [Ref. 55]
Civil-military integration will allow DOD to gain access to leading-edge
technology and enable the military to insert this technology not only during the
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development stage but also once a system is fielded. "The biggest-potential for use of
commercial items is in electronic components, software, and advanced materials." [Ref.
43] Both electronic components and software have the commercial sector leading the
defense sector in innovative research.
6. Leverage
U.S. defense spending on R&D has grown about 50% since 1960. By
comparison, commercial spending on R&D in the U.S. has grown by 400% over the same
period. [Ref. 31]
Although Federal R&D is declining relative to the overall national R&D budget,
it is still a significant part of the discretionary budget. More than half of the Federal
budget is now spent on non-discretionary expenditures such as social security, Medicaid,
and interest on the national debt. The remaining items such as the defense budget are
discretionary and must be approved annually. Of the total R&D budget, defense R&D is
the largest component followed by health.
The breakdown ofR&D into various categories must also be reviewed. IfR&D is
divided into basic research, applied research, and development, there is a significant
difference between the distribution of funds in the commercial and military sector.
Defense R&D is two percent basic research, seven percent applied research, and 91
percent development; conversely self-financed industrial R&D is six percent basic
research, 25 percent applied research and 69 percent development. [Ref. 31:p. 106]
With defense R&D shrinking compared to total commercial and Government R&D, and
only a portion being used for basic and applied research, leverage becomes important.
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Commercial R&D is now leading the technological breakthroughs and DOD can not
finance all the state-of-the-art advances on its own.
Leverage allows DoD to take a portion of its research funds to find military uses
for research conducted by commercial firms.
7. Surge Capabilities
A small defense-only base limits surge capabilities. Civil-military integration will
make it easier to build back military capabilities to a higher level in emergencies. For
example if a firm can make military and commercial items off the same production line
and is profitable with one shift, then in a time of crisis a second or third shift may be
added. If the firm is already at full capacity then production and delivery of military
items could be expedited over the commercial counterparts.
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter presented several advantages and disadvantages of civil-military
integration of the defense industrial base. The disadvantages of pursuing a policy of CMI
are: a history of failure, determining who benefits, product support, reliability,
dependence on foreign sources, technology transfers to hostile states, training of
acquisition personnel, quality assurance, potential for fraud, loss of technical data rights,
and leverage. The benefits of CMI are: reduced costs (both administrative and direct),
reduced time in the acquisition process, increased competition, technology transfer from
the commercial sector, and leverage.
The following chapter addresses barriers preventing the integration of the
commercial and military industrial bases.
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V. BARRIERS TO CIVIL-MILITARY INTEGRATION
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter focuses on the barriers to civil-military integration as well as
possible incentives to commercial and defense firms to pursue integration.
Over the last several decades, standards, regulations, and specifications have been
imposed on defense contractors that increased the segregation of the defense industry
from traditional commercial firms. The purpose of these unique Government require-
ments was to promote socioeconomic equity and competition in the marketplace, account
for taxpayer's funds, and ensure performance of items in a military environment. A
concern on the part of the Government about the potential for fraud, waste, and abuse
results in regulations above and beyond existing commercial codes and civil and criminal
penalties for illegal actions.
In response to the regulations, defense contractors developed organizational
structures and practices to enable them to conform to the Federal requirements. The cost
of these structures is an allowable expense under Government contracts and is factored
into the price of the final product. Firms that supply both the commercial and defense
markets often have segregated defense and commercial units. [Ref. 56:p. x]
Pentagon contracting policies present a major obstacle for most defense firms
trying to enter the civilian market as well as commercial firms trying to enter the defense
market. The primary barriers to implementing dual-use policies are regulatory and
bureaucratic, rather than technical. [Ref. 37:p. 240]
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B. LITERATURE ADDRESSING BARRIERS TO CIVIL-MILITARY
INTEGRATION
The barriers identified and discussed in this chapter are primarily drawn from
three studies. Randall's thesis, "An Analysis of Reasons Commercial Entities Prefer Not
to Participate in Defense Business" identified factors that discouraged participation in
defense business by commercial firms. The Center for Strategic and International Studies
has released two reports that address barriers to civil-military integration. The first,
"Integrating Commercial and Military Technologies for National Strength" identified
four major barriers to integration: accounting differences, specifications and standards,
technical data rights, and unique contract requirements. [Ref. 56] 'Integrating
Commercial and Military Technologies for National Strength" researched barriers for
commercial firms trying to enter defense markets and defense firms trying to diversify to
commercial work. A second CSIS study, "How U.S. Defense Industries View
Diversification" conducted a survey to assess the degree to which acquisition regulations
prevented diversification by defense firms into the commercial market. [Ref. 57]
Randall's thesis repeated research conducted by Lamm in 1987 studying the
principal reasons for firms' refusal to participate in DoD business. Randall found that the
primary reasons commercial firms elect not to participate in defense work, in order of
frequency, were: burdensome paper work, Government bidding methods, more attractive
commercial ventures, non-defense related product, low profitability, and inflexible
procurement policies. [Ref. 58]
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Despite efforts at acquisition reform over the past ten years through the Federal
Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) and Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA), the
reasons firms cited for not entering the defense business identified by Randall were
similar to those identified in 1987.
The top concerns for not participating in Defense business were the same
for 1997 as they were for 1987. Burdensome paperwork, which was cited
by 70% of the respondents in 1997, was cited by 69% of the 1987
respondents. Additionally, 67% of the respondent's reasons for becoming
a defense contractor during the past ten years were not related to
acquisition reform initiatives. [Ref. 58:p. 143]
In the Reddy study defense firms were asked the following question: "In general,
do you believe that DOD contracting policies make it more difficult for the defense
sectors of your company to enter or flourish in civilian market areas?" Table 5.1 reveals
that seventy-one percent of the firms answered either "yes to a large degree" or "yes, to
some degree. [Ref. 57:p. 24]
Table 5.1. Perceived Effect ofDOD Contracting Policies on Defense
Firms' Civilian Markets [Ref. 57:p. 25]







All 49% 22% 10% 19%
Aerospace 50% 34% 8% 8%
Electronics 50% 25% 0% 25%
>50% DOD
Sales 61% 28% 0% 11%
<50% DOD
Sales 44% 24% 12% 20%
"DOD contracting policies make it more difficult for firms to enter or flourish in
civilian markets." [Ref. 57:p. 25]
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Once it was established that firms felt that DoD contracting policies may inhibit
their ability to enter the civilian market, the study provided the respondents with a list of
eight specific DoD contracting policies and asked them to rank them in the order in which
they posed the greatest barrier. Table 5.2 summarizes the results.
Table 5.2. Rank Order of Factors Inhibiting Entry into Civilian











Required use of parts and equipment
built to military specifications 1 1 2 1 2
Separate accounting procedures for
defense products 2 6 1 4 1
Specified manufacturing processes 3 2 6 2 5
Excessive auditing for defense
contracts 4 7 3 5 3
Long-term instability of defense
programs 5 3 5 6 4
Specified quality control techniques 6 4 4 3 6
|
Restricted use of civilian facilities 7 5 8 7 7
1 Overuse of suspension and
debarment actions in defense
contracts
8 8 7 8 8
The findings above indicate that the requirement to use MILSPECS rather than
commercial processes, parts, or equipment is the policy posing the greatest barrier.
Specified manufacturing processes and quality control techniques are addressed in
MILSPECS and for the purpose of this paper will not be addressed separately. Separate
accounting requirements was the second greatest barrier, followed by excessive auditing.
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C. BARRIERS
1. Specifications and Standards
Defense firms view military specifications as the policy most inhibiting their
ability to enter civilian market areas. The respondents were not required to answer why
they thought each item was a particular barrier.
Although use of MILSPECS may cost more in the short run, over time they may
save on life cycle costs because of increased logistics support and configuration
management costs for components not in the military logistics system. However, the
highly specialized nature of military equipment limits a defense firm's ability to
transform its existing product to a civilian one especially if the MILSPEC differs from
common commercial practices and standards. According to Gansler, military
specifications create a barrier to commercial procurement when they:
1
.
Describe items which are essentially non-military in nature;
2. Require products or processes that are obsolete;
3. Detail process ("how to do it") rather than performance ("what is needed")
requirements;
4. Are misapplied or inflexibly applied;
5. Are automatically imposed on subcontractors, even when they may be
applicable only to the prime contractor; and
6. Differ unnecessarily from common practices and standards. [Ref. 59:p.
135]
Recognizing that a dual-use-manufacturing base cannot be achieved while DoD
maintains a separate set of standards, MILSPECS were addressed by Congress under
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FASA. As part of FASA and under the direction of the Secretary of Defense all heads of
agencies were to ensure that to the maximum extent practical:
(1) requirements of the agency with respect to a procurement of
supplies and services are stated in terms of
-
(a) functions to be performed;
(b) performance required; or
(c) essential physical characteristics;
(2) such requirements are defined so that commercial items or, to the
extent that commercial items suitable to meet the agency's needs
are not available, nondevelopmental items other than commercial
items may be procured to fulfill such requirements. . . [Ref. 60]
2. Accounting Requirements
The second greatest barrier noted by Reddy was accounting requirements.
Government Accounting Requirements can be divided into Cost Accounting Standards,
Cost Principles, and Requirements for Cost or Pricing Data. Government contracts
require the application of several accounting procedures and rules that are not used in the
conduct of commercial business. Costs that might be legal under Internal Revenue
Service regulations or Generally Accepted Accounting Procedures (GAAP) may be
unallowable under Government contracts.
Accounting requirements are a result of Government efforts to ensure it pays "fair
and reasonable" prices for the goods or services it procures. In the traditional free
market, competitive market forces determine price and cost is irrelevant. However a
Government contracting officer still has the option to request cost or pricing data. If the
market lacks competitive forces there is some attempt to estimate what the market would
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or ought to do through the imposition of reporting systems. These reporting systems
attempt to provide information on the "true" cost of the product as well as on how the
firm is managed, labor relations and other issues. [Ref. 39:p. 44] The accounting
regulations serve to limit profit, and protect the Government against fraud. As programs
become more complex and expensive the accounting regulations also served as tools to
manage cost overruns and schedule slippage.
a. Cost Accounting Standards
Public Law 100-679 (41 U.S.C.422) requires certain contractors and
subcontractors to comply with Cost Accounting Standards (CAS) and to disclose in
writing and follow consistently their disclosed cost accounting practices. [Ref. 61 :p. 166]
Cost Accounting Standards have two goals. The first is to promote uniformity in
accounting practices among Government contractors and the second is to obtain
consistency in accounting treatment of costs by individual Government contractors. [Ref.
61 :p. 166] FAR Part 30, Cost Accounting Standards Administration, promulgates
procedures for applying the CAS such as accounting for the cost of money, depreciating
capital assets, and allocating general overhead. CAS typically applies to prime and
subcontracts over $500,000. The following types of contracts are exempt from CAS:
• Those where price is based on established catalog or market prices of
commercial items sold in substantial quantities to the general public.
• Those where price is set by law or regulation.
• Contracts and subcontracts with Small Business concerns.
• Sealed bid contracts.
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• Labor Surplus Area Set-Aside contracts.
• Contracts with foreign Governments. [Ref. 61:p. 167]
Some of the CAS procedures are different from the Generally Accepted
Accounting Procedures (GAAP). An example is CAS 409- Depreciation of Tangible
Capital Assets - which requires contractors to compute depreciation using procedures that
may differ from tax or financial reporting procedures. [Ref. 56:p. 31]
CAS may prohibit prime contractors from partnering with leading
commercial suppliers. For example, Pratt & Whitney makes aircraft engines for both
commercial and defense customers. The engines require sophisticated electronic systems
to operate, however companies such as Intel and Motorola "will not partner with Pratt &
Whitney in custom technology development for the military because they will not abide
by cost accounting standards and other unique defense requirements." [Ref. 28 :p. 10]
b. Cost Principles
The cost principles are addressed in FAR Part 31, Contract Cost Principles
and Procedures. These principles outline what charges against a Government contract are
allowable. They apply to contract pricing "where cost analysis is performed and/or where
the determination, negotiation, or allowance of costs when required by a contract clause."
[Ref. 62] A senior officer in the company must certify that all costs reported under a
Government contract are allowable in accordance with FAR Part 3 1
.
To protect itself, a company will not only have to track its own costs but
also that of its suppliers. "The problem is not that the information cannot be obtained.
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Rather, the problem is that a growing number of commercial companies are unwilling to
invest the money and effort for what amounts to a relatively small erratic and lower-profit
portion of their business." [Ref. 56:p. 32] Companies may fear that without detailed
documentation of costs under a well-established Government cost accounting system they
risk criminal sanctions.
c. Requirementsfor Cost or Pricing Data
In 1962, Congress passed the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA). The
purpose of the Act was to put the Government on equal footing with contractors in
contract negotiations. Prior to award of a negotiated contract, a contractor may by
required by the Truth in Negotiations Act to certify as current, accurate and complete,
cost or pricing data. Further, the contractor is subject to penalties if the data are found
defective. Contracts that are awarded under adequate price competition, under $500,000,
for items whose price is set by law or regulation, or for commercial products are
exempted. However, contracting officers may require certification of cost or pricing data
even if not required by law. In FY 1997, about 53,000 contractual actions, valued at
about $46.3 billion, were subjected to the Truth in Negotiations Act. [Ref. 49] This
represents approximately 37 percent of procurement outlays of $126.8 billion for the
DoD in 1997 and twenty percent of the contract actions over $25,000. [Ref. 63]
The data provided by the contractors must be accumulated in accordance
with CAS rules and the cost of collecting the information is not reimbursable. [Ref. 56:p.
34] As the costs for TINA compliance start occurring during the solicitation phase before
a company enters a contract with the Government, it serves as a barrier preventing
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commercial firms considering defense work. A Coopers & Lybrand study found that
TINA requirements were the second highest cost driver of all Government regulations
behind MILSPEC compliance. [Ref. 64:p. 18a]
Proponents of the Act claim that the Act encourages most sole-source
contractors to be open and fair and the benefits of the Act outweigh the costs. [Ref. 49:p.
29] The assumption here is that contractors would raise prices to exorbitant levels if not
legally required to disclose true costs. However contractors know Government funds are
limited and realize, as all sellers do, that if a price is too high the customer will decline to
purchase the item. If the Government feels that the pricing risk is sufficiently high, it can
require data on a particular contract or portion of a contract.
It should be noted that in Reddy's study categories of barriers were
provided to respondents. Alic, Bingaman, and Gansler have identified additional barriers:
technical data rights, unique contract requirements, budget process, commercially
uneconomical orders.
3. Technical Data Rights
In an effort to increase competition and reduce reliance on sole-source
procurement the Government may seek the right to "use, duplicate, or disclose to others
technical information concerning products it purchases, particularly in cases where the
Government has funded the product's development." [Ref. 31:p. 149] The Government
may use the rights to find sources other than the developer to manufacture, repair, or
maintain the component developed.
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A concern of industry is that the technology developed for the Government may
include background technology developed at the contractor's expense. As a result a
company may segregate DoD development projects from internally funded commercial
efforts or refuse to take on DoD work altogether.
Under current law and DoD regulations technical data rights fall under three
categories: unlimited rights, Government Purpose License Rights (GPLR), and limited
rights. Unlimited rights are obtained when the Government fully funds the development
or specifies unlimited rights in a contract, or if the development was accomplished during
and was necessary for the performance of the contract. [Ref. 56:p. 59] GPLR provide for
unlimited usage by the Government including transfer of the rights to a third party to use
in a Government contract, but prevent the Government from letting third parties use the
data for non-Government purposes. GPLR are obtained when there is mixed funding for
the development or when commercial utilization of the technology is desired. Limited
rights prohibit the Government from disclosing the data without approval of the
contractor and prevent its use for competitive reprocurement.
Technical data rights serve as a barrier to commercial military integration because
firms that make a military modification to a state-of-the-art commercial process may face
a situation in which the Government wants unlimited rights. Under GPLR there is a fear
that once the Government provides a second source with the data rights a competitor may
use the information for its commercial business despite the nondisclosure provisions.
Lastly, bidders offering limited rights may be penalized in a "best value" competitive
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solicitation if the Government feels that limited rights may result in higher life cycle
costs.
4. Unique Contract Requirements
The Government seeks many goals in addition to accountability for taxpayers'
funds. Federal contracts also contain provisions to promote socioeconomic goals, control
sources of supply, and control relations with suppliers. The myriad of required clauses
resulting from legislative and regulatory controls may be applied differently among
contract offices. For example, the GAO found that in order for a supplier to sell an
identical commercial oscilloscope to the Army, Navy, and Air Force a supplier had to
deal with 205 different contract clauses of which only 12 percent overlapped among the
three contracts. [Ref. 59:p. 138] Table 5.3 provides a non-exhaustive selection of
contract requirements placed in defense contractors.
a. Source Restrictions
The U.S. Government has historically put a preference on the purchase of domestic
materials in order to protect a domestic industry. For example, the Buy American Act
favors domestic sources by requiring a cost differential be added to foreign products. A
bid from a foreign source will have a certain percentage (determined by law) added to it.
If the award is solely based on price and the foreign bid is still lower with the differential,
it will receive the award. If the differential causes the price to exceed the domestic bid,
the domestic source will receive the award. Other contract clauses require a manufacturer
to certify that the item meets a level of domestic content. However many firms now
produce components offshore or use offshore suppliers that are more efficient than
66
Table 5.3 Contract Requirements Placed on Defense Contractors
Objective Category Program
Labor Service Contract Act
Davis Bacon Act
Labor Surplus Area Subcontracting. Program; 15 USC
644 (d)-(f)




Affirmative Action Compliance; E.O. 1 1246
Equal Opportunity Compliance; E.O. 11246
Cert. OfNon-Segregated Facilities; E.O. 1 1246
Affirmative Action for Handicapped Workers; 29 USC
793
Business Set Asides Utilization of Women-Owned Small Business; E.O.
12138
Small Business and Small Disadvantaged Business
Subcontracting Plan; 15 USC 637(d) 4-6
Foreign Acquisitions & Source
Restrictions
Buy American Act Balance of Payments Program
Certificates; Buy American Act and Balance of
Payments Program; 42 USC lOa-d, 10b-l.
Foreign Source Restrictions; DFARS 253.225-7025
Required Sources for Jewel Bearings and Related
Items; PL 90-496
Relations with Suppliers Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
False Claims Act (Civil) 31 USC 3729
False Claims Act (Criminal) 10 USC 287
Anti-Kickback Act 41 USC 51-58
Truth in Negotiations Act 10 USC 2306 (f)
Procurement Integrity Act 41 USC 423
Drug-Free Workplace Drug-Free Workplace; 41 USC 701
Source: Developed by researcher.
protected domestic sources. The result is a disincentive to accept defense work.
Companies would have to dual source suppliers and segregate costs of their commercial
work from their defense production in order to remain competitive in the commercial
market.
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FASA did not address source restriction at the prime contract level.
However, implementation of FASA into the FAR precluded "flowing this restriction
down" to subcontractors providing commercial items or commercial components.
Even if regulations are identified as barriers to integration, there will
always be supporters justifying their necessity. Two additional regulations slated for
repeal or elimination through the proposed Defense Reform Act of 1 998 are elimination
of fee limitations and changes to the False Claims Act. [Ref. 49:p. 25]
b. False Claims Act
A contractor faces heavy fines and administrative penalties for fraudulent
conduct. A person who "knowingly" submits a false or fraudulent claim for
reimbursement is liable under the Act. A person acts knowingly if he has actual
knowledge of the information or acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the
information. [Ref. 65] The Government is not required to find proof of specific intent to
defraud the Government.
The False Claims Act has been cited as a reason that commercial
contractors will not do business with the Government. Commercial contractors fear that
if they make a mistake they will be charged with fraud. [Ref. 49 :p. 26] Under the False
Claims Act a contractor is subjected to penalties and treble damages for submitting
erroneous documentation.
According to Eleanor Hill, Inspector General, Department of Defense,
A simple mistake does not amount to a false claim subject to the False
Claims Act. The Act requires a knowing submission of a false or
fraudulent claim; the knowing use of a false record or statement to get a
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false or fraudulent claim paid; or a conspiracy to defraud the Government
by knowingly getting a false or fraudulent claim paid. [Ref. 49:p. 27]
However, it is difficult to prove deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard
of the truth. As a result courts have found it sufficient for criminal convictions if
evidence is presented beyond a reasonable doubt of the falsity of the statement. [Ref.
49:p. 27]
If evidence does not exist beyond a reasonable doubt then the False
Claims Act allows for civil penalties when knowledge of a falsity is proven by a
preponderance of the evidence. If the Government cannot win in a criminal trial it may
pursue a civil case. Despite Ms. Hill's assurances, the power given to the Government
under the Act is hardly attractive to businesses contemplating bidding on Government
contracts.
The qui tarn provisions of the civil False Claims Act allow private
individuals to initiate lawsuits on behalf of themselves and the Government and then keep
a share of the Government's recovery. [Ref. 66] Qui Tarn is the legal term for "Who
sues on behalf of the King as well as himself." Under U.S. law the plaintiff states that he
sues for the state as well as himself.
During the Persian Gulf War the Air Force placed an emergency order for
6,000 commercial two-way radios manufactured by Motorola. The Pentagon waived all
MILSPECS. However, DoD was unable to get Motorola to certify that the Government
was getting the lowest price for the product. Motorola executives cited that the radios
were marketed through a variety of channels with varying prices. Motorola also did not
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have a Government-approved cost accounting system required for the certification. Any
misstatement by Motorola regarding the cost of the radios could have resulted in a felony
conviction. Therefore, no senior official would certify the price of the radios. To solve
the dilemma, the Government of Japan bought the radios and donated them to the Air
Force as part of their contribution to the allied war effort. [Ref. 28 :p. 9] The reforms
initiated by FASA would allow DoD to purchase these units now, however the False
Claims Act still makes headlines in awards against defense contractors.
In April 1998, a Federal Jury imposed a $310 million fine against FMC
Corporation, the manufacturer of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. An FMC employee
discovered that the Bradley, which was supposed to float across rivers and lakes, tended
to leak when crossing a body of water. FMC delivered the Bradley claiming that it
floated. The employee's main accusation, under the False Claims Act, was that it did
leak and could therefore sink when crossing a river. Using the qui tarn provision, the
employee and his lawyers received $77 million with the remainder going to the U.S.
Treasury. [Ref. 66]
c. Fee Limitations
The Department of Defense Reform Act of 1998 proposes a repeal of the
fee limits on cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contracts for experimental, developmental, or
research work. Currently, the fee limitation is 15 percent for research and development
contracts, six percent for architectural or engineering (A&E) services, and ten percent for
any other CPFF contracts. Proponents of the fee limitation claim that there is adequate
competition with the limits in place and that they prevent overspending on design to the
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detriment of manufacture or construction. According to the Department of Defense
Inspector General, 84 percent of A&E contract awards had multiple bidders. [Ref. 49]
However, if there are multiple bidders for these contracts, shouldn't competition, not a
statute set the profit level? Why does the Government need a profit ceiling on the 84% of
contracts that are awarded competitively?
Profit as a barrier to attracting commercial firms to defense business was
also documented by Randall who found that changes in acquisition laws (reforms) over
the previous 10 years were not sufficient for firms to see DoD work as a profitable
venture. [Ref. 58:p. 136]
5. Budget Process
The U.S. Government operates under a single-year defense budget process. In
contrast, commercial firms make multiyear procurement commitments to plan
production, forecast labor needs, and procure materials in advance to take advantage of
volume discounts. [Ref. 59:p. 140] Multiyear procurement commitments are the
exception for DoD requirements. Multiyear procurement would enable the DoD to
provide stability to suppliers and enable them to develop long term forecasts.
6. Commercially Uneconomical Orders
With defense budgets and the resultant purchase of goods and services varying
from year to year, some firms are unwilling to make the investments needed to maintain
facilities or skilled personnel for military equipment. [Ref. 25 :p. 46] The reduction in
the number of goods purchased often results in a lower number of producers and, in many
cases, multiple producers of an item will not exist. The end result from reduced
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competition is that the Government will be required to impose cost accounting and
oversight on the remaining contractor and further discourage CMI.
7. Cultural Barrier
The current acquisition culture tends to emphasize that personnel know more
about how to apply the regulations than about the actual products they buy. [Ref. 25 :p.
77] The skills and background of acquisition personnel may serve as an obstacle to
acceptance of using commercial items or practices. The fact that acquisition reform has
not increased commercial firms' willingness to take on defense work may be a result of
reforms not being implemented by contracting personnel as well as a failure of DoD to
communicate the reforms to commercial manufacturers. [Ref. 58:p. 136] Media
sensationalism of any procurement mistake further encourages acquisition personnel to
stay with tried and true standards and processes rather than looking for commercial
practices or products.
There is a cultural difference in the approach to innovation between the
commercial and military sectors. There are several instances where innovation is similar
such as for large capital equipment or regulated industries. However "[the] opportunities
for synergy are limited." [Ref. 31:p. 44] Table 5.4 identifies differences in the civil and
military cultures with regard to innovation. Any policy promoting innovation through
civil military integration will have to address these differences.
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D. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES
Defense contractors were also given a list of incentives for moving into civilian
production and asked to rank them. The survey asked "If the federal Government were to
offer incentives for moving into civilian production, which would be most attractive?"
Table 5.4. Two Cultures - Civil and Military Innovation [Ref. 31 :p. 44]
Civil Military
Impetus for Design Market Driven, opportunistic
introduction of new products
Dictated by military
requirements




Product Cycle Measured in years Measured in decades






Production High rates and volumes (in
consumer product industries)










Technology sharing Success based on proprietary
technological advantage
Success may require sharing
know-how with second
source contractor
Given a list of five incentives, respondents ranked them as follows (from the most
attractive to the least):
1
.
Government reimbursement for self-initiated R&D costs in civilian fields
in the framework ofDoD contracts with departments of Government other
than the Pentagon (e.g., Transportation, Energy, Health, Education,
Justice).
2. Easing ofDoD contracting policies.
3. Increase in DoD R&D ceilings.
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4. Tax incentives for "dual-use" applications.
5. Adoption of "dual-use" as a broad national policy, but with no other
Government action. [Ref. 57:p. 28]
The first choice for incentives for entering the civilian market was for defense
contractors to increase their business with civilian Government agencies, followed by an
easing ofDoD contracting policies.
Randall found that companies wanted the following improvements in acquisition
procedures to enter defense business:
1. Reduce the use of military specifications;
2. Eliminate non-relevant paperwork in bidding requirements;
3. Ensure timely payments to contractors;
4. Reduce the amount of paperwork in the overall procurement process.
A difference between incentives for defense firms to broaden into commercial
work and commercial firms to enter into the defense business is that defense firms prefer
to broaden into commercial work with Government assistance. They prefer to expand
into contracts with other Government agencies and seek subsidies for R&D or tax
incentives. This may be an indication that they want to stay connected to the
Government as a customer or rely on the Government to subsidize any dual-use projects.
The common feature between the Reddy and Randall findings is the incentive of
easing DoD contracting policies such as military specifications.
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E. SUMMARY
The barriers to civil-military integration identified by both commercial and
defense firms are all regulatory in nature. They can be summarized as accounting
requirements, military specifications, technical data rights, and unique contract
requirements. Contractors have little control over removing the barriers, as they are
Government imposed. The barriers contribute to a cultural perception that there is "too
much paperwork" for entering the defense business by commercial firms and that
Government assistance is needed for defense firms to diversify into the commercial
sector.





The previous chapters discussed several issues: the consolidation of the defense
industrial base resulting from the reduction in defense spending; the differences between
traditional defense markets and the weapons market; the policy of expanding the defense
industrial base through civil-military integration (CMI); the benefits and costs of carrying
out CMI; and the barriers to implementing CMI. This chapter analyzes the information
collected, and presented in the previous chapters.
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF A STRONG DIB
^
1. Independence from Foreign Suppliers
Foreign sources of supply may provide products unsuitable to a Government's
needs and dependence on such products may result in monopoly prices. However,
dependency on foreign sources should not be confused with vulnerability. If a purchasing
Government has several foreign sources to choose from, it can conduct risk analysis on
the possible interruption of supply similar to that conducted on domestic suppliers. As
long as the dependency is not concentrated in one country or geographic area, foreign
supply may be as safe as a domestic source with significant market power. Policy makers
must know the difference between dependency and vulnerability when placing source
restrictions on components.
77
The DoD's use of a foreign supplier may prevent monopoly behavior from a sole-
source domestic producer or, in the case of the United States, recently consolidated
domestic suppliers. Civil-military integration could create a greater dependency on or
vulnerability to foreign suppliers.
Commercial firms operating in a global marketplace may elect not to accept
defense business when faced with source restrictions. Before imposing source
restrictions that serve as a barrier to attracting commercial firms, the Government should
determine its vulnerability to an interruption in supply.
2. Unsuitable Equipment
Another benefit of a strong defense industrial base is that it is easier to tailor
weapon systems to the producing nation's needs. When nations with no industrial base
purchase weapons from supplier nations, however, options on the weapons platform are
negotiable. Some tailoring or customization can take place. The latest block upgrade
may not be available for security reasons; however, an older variant may be. This older
variant may be adequate to address the threat from the buying Government's potential
adversary.
A supplier also benefits from providing weapons platforms similar to those it
uses. The indirect costs of production can be spread over many weapons and repair parts,
reducing the overall cost of the system. Interoperability during military exercises is also
enhanced since both countries will have similar training and can use interchangeable
parts. Governments without an industrial base know these advantages and will negotiate






Leverage was also cited as a benefit of a strong defense industrial base, yet
purchasing Governments could apply leverage as well. Countries without a DIB can
threaten to go to rival suppliers to reduce prices or negotiate upgrades. They can then use
this leverage to encourage suppliers to provide weapons with the latest technology or
tailored systems to meet the purchasing countries' needs.
,
4. National Economic Benefits\
The national economic benefits of a defense industrial base may also be
overstated. First, despite the reductions in procurement spending, there are now more
defense employees than there were twenty years ago. Although cuts in the procurement
budget may lead to an initial decrease of employment, the evidence suggests that defense
workers transition into other fields. Employment levels may be tied more to the overall
health of the national economy than to Government spending.
k 5. Self-Sufficiency & Production Capabilities
Although a strong DIB provides self-sufficiency, it also has its costs. The
exclusion of foreign sources in order to promote self-sufficiency may result in monopoly
prices from the domestic supplier. In addition, the buyer may not obtain the efficiencies
and innovation associated with a competitive marketplace. There is no empirical
evidence for measuring the exact cost of maintaining self-sufficiency for various weapon
systems. However, the U.S. Government, in the case of submarines, believed that the
benefits exceeded the costs. The desires to be ready to respond to an emergency and to
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maintain unique capabilities led the U.S. Government to purchase a weapon (the Seawolf)
that might not have been immediately necessary.
It may be that submarine manufacturing continues despite a lack of need because
the technologies and manufacturing processes are uniquely military. It would be difficult
to count on commercial technologies or processes to maintain the skills or handle any
future surge requirement.
Civil-military integration may contribute to maintaining production capabilities
through the use of flexible manufacturing processes. Companies such as TRW, which
can produce military and commercial items on the same assembly line, could increase
production rapidly to meet any surge requirements. A potential production capability
serves as a deterrent to hostile Governments and, therefore, provides security benefits.
Of the advantages discussed above, leverage and unsuitable equipment can be
addressed at the negotiating table and do not appear to provide major advantages over
countries without a defense industrial base. The advantage of independence from foreign
sources may be diluted through CMI. As the economy becomes increasingly global,
commercial suppliers without source restrictions look for the best value worldwide.
There is also evidence, levels of employment in particular, to refute the idea that the
defense industrial base provides national economic benefits that could not be obtained
through private-sector spending. The benefits of self-sufficiency are costly, but the U.S.
Government's decision to maintain self-sufficiency in submarine production may show
that the security benefits are sometimes perceived to outweigh the costs.
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C. THE FREE MARKET VS. THE WEAPONS MARKET
Many free market practices are now similar to defense market practices. For
manufacturers of large capital equipment, there are few sellers in both markets. Through
the use of cost as an independent variable (CAIV), procurement officials may trade
performance for price as a buyer in the commercial market would.
Unlike the commercial market, the Government serves as buyer, regulator, and
judge of claims in the defense market. The Government establishes the barriers, whether
real or perceived, to entering and exiting the defense market. The differences between
commercial and Government contracts are essentially in contract type, length, and
objective.
The Government will use cost-plus contracts for research and development,
whereas commercial contracts are almost exclusively fixed-price. Both traditional and
weapons contracts may change over the course of the contract. A commercial contract
may have a fixed scope and price because it must be completed more quickly than a
weapons contract. And Government contracts for major acquisitions may also be, on
average, longer than their commercial counterparts. Government contracts may take
several years to go from concept exploration through research and development.
One of the goals of acquisition reform is to eliminate oversight and, instead, have
insight (i.e., understanding of) a contractor's processes. With this new emphasis on
decreasing involvement in the steps of the process, the Government maintains an "arm's
length" relationship and, in some cases, establishes "teaming" arrangements. As a result,
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the relationship between buyer and seller is not as differentiated as it was prior to
acquisition reform.
The difference in dispute resolution between commercial and Government
contracts also has narrowed. Disputes in traditional contracts are not always litigated
because commercial firms are sensitive to the costs of litigation and may handle
differences informally or through alternative dispute resolution.
The differing objectives of traditional and Government contracts result in a barrier
to CMI. The purpose of commercial contracts is to obtain goods and services, whereas
Government contracts often to promote socioeconomic goals in addition to obtaining the
desired goods and services.
D. STRATEGIES FOR ACHIEVING CMI
This researcher found three options for expanding the defense industrial base
through civil-military integration: defense conversion, diversification, and dual-use
technology. Defense conversion proved to be the riskiest policy since defense companies
tended to rely on Government investment and programs to pursue this strategy. Most
attempts at conversion were geared toward a policy the Government was trying to
promote at the time, rather than toward conversion to a familiar technology. The
examples that were cited by this researcher—Government-supported programs such as
alternative energy sources and mass transit—resulted in failure. The drawback to
conversion is that if the "crisis" goes away, so will Government funding. As energy
prices dropped after the seventies and early eighties, the years when the conversion
82
programs existed, the need for mass transit and alternative energy sources also
disappeared. Had the defense firms pursued a market similar to their core technology, as
Raytheon did with microwave technology, the results may have been different.
The second option, diversification, was a strategy to reduce reliance on defense
business. The mergers and acquisitions over the past decade were more of a
consolidation of defense industries with the defense divisions of diversified firms. Loral
acquired or merged with IBM Federal Systems, Ford Aerospace and Goodyear
Aerospace. Northrop Grumman and Raytheon acquired Westinghouse's and Texas
Instrument's Defense Divisions, respectively. The Department of Defense is not
currently encouraging or pursuing the strategy of diversification to integrate the defense
industrial base. In fact, until 1998, the DoD encouraged consolidation.
The key to achieving CMI may be through the third option, designing for dual-
use. This program enables the DoD to incorporate, from the outset, commercial rather
than unique military technologies. An important factor for success is the environment in
which the product will have to operate. A successful example of dual-use were satellites
in which the commercial item would operate in essentially the same environment as the
military one. Just having many similar components in the defense and commercial
systems is not enough. Recognizing the ultimate environment in which the system will
have to operate may be as important as integrating the production line through similar
processes and standard parts to reduce costs.
Dual-use is not without deficiencies. For example, military agencies guiding the
dual-use program will push innovation and technological development in directions that
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are not economically optimal for commercial or military use. To realize the benefits of
dual-use, agencies may develop a sub-optimal solution for both commercial and military
uses. The benefits of "spin-offs" from dual-use may not be sufficient to offset the sub-
optimal military research and development used to obtain the benefits.
Continued support and maintainability will also be a key issue. The F-22, which
uses dual-use technologies for many of its avionics, cannot be built as designed due to the
pullout of a commercial supplier and the lack of a substitute. This negates any time
saving gained from the insertion of the commercial technology into the platform.
The Commercial Operations and Support Savings Initiative (COS SI) enabled the
Government to use Other Transactions Authority to attract non-traditional firms to the
defense market. The program is expected to save money over the long run through use of
commercial technologies; however, no agreements have reached the production stage, in
which standard procurement regulations will apply. COSSI's ability to attract
commercial firms to defense work may also be questioned. Traditional defense
contractors accounted for 80 percent of the participants in "other transactions." The
program did, therefore, attract new suppliers; however, it should not be considered a
complete success because program offices were given freedom from Government
regulations. When the production stage is reached and standard procurement clauses
apply, some of the participants may choose not to participate.
COSSI also faced erratic budgeting. Except for the continuation of existing
agreements, Congress cut funding for COSSI in FY 1998. Personnel at the program
office thought this was due to DoD's inability to convince Congress of the initiative's
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importance. The 1999 budget contained funds for COSSI, but this highlights a weakness
of initiatives: they are subject to changes in perceptions of their need.
E. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF CMI
1. Advantages
The primary advantage of CMI is the expansion of the industrial base to meet
surge capacity, increased competition, and leverage in research funding. If CMI is
successful, the DoD will be able to draw upon significantly more contractors and
industrial capacity to produce required items for an emergency. The U.S. military could
use this potential power to gradually augment existing forces, an important factor in the
military's desire to be able to support two major regional conflicts simultaneously.
An increased number of contractors available to produce items for the military
should result in greater competition. This competition should result in innovation and
lower prices. Furthermore, adequate price competition would eliminate the need for
several regulations that currently impede CMI.
Leverage is another cited advantage of CMI. Costs for developing new
technologies will be shared with the commercial applications, resulting in overall lower
investments required. The capabilities, however, may not be as great as if funding and
research were targeted for military use only.
2. Disadvantages
This researcher identified several disadvantages to CMI, such as determining who
will benefit from any policy established, transfer of technology, loss of standardization,
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reduced reliability, and integration of commercial components. When a program is
initiated to advance a policy, it will be difficult to determine who will benefit from it. For
example, the Government would have to determine which previously protected domestic
sources must compete on the world market. Established defense firms may also resent
the fact that regulations they fall under are waived for newcomers to the defense market
However, as few firms have taken advantage of the initiatives waiving the requirements
such as "other transactions authority," this is not a great issue.
Segregation of commercial and military technologies helped prevent transfer of
sensitive technologies to hostile nations. In the case of missile technology, Loral
successfully lobbied the administration for permission to transfer technology used in its
commercial systems to the Chinese Government. The administration then designated the
technology to be under the jurisdiction of the Commerce Department rather than the
Department of State. The results were a transfer of technology that the Chinese
Government converted to military use. This issue has serious security implications and
will likely result in additional monitoring by Congress. As a result, firms may fear that
any technologies they develop with the DoD could be restricted when they try to export
them as commercial products.
Another disadvantage of CMI is the possible loss of standardization. Commercial
firms market their products as unique and not as commodities. Commercial components
may meet performance specifications and fall under a broad standard; however, they may
not be interchangeable. The design of a weapons platform and the integration of
86
commercial components pose additional risks through the loss of standardization that was
present with a military specification.
The reliability of commercial products also must be addressed. When commercial
and military systems are designed to operate in the same environment, such as space,
reliability is a minor issue. However, if a component is designed to work in an office
environment, yet may also have to operate in the Arctic Circle or the desert, reliability
becomes a major issue. With the limited space inside a weapons platform such as a
tactical fighter, radiation and electromagnetic hardening also become important.
Performance specifications must address these environments, and the result may be
components as unique as a MILSPEC item.
Integration of the components will also be difficult. Dual-use technology can
reduce the overall cost of the technology in items such as night vision devices and GPS
units. However, in these often-cited technologies, the units were used as stand-alone
devices. If they are integrated into a complete system such as an avionics package, the
cost savings may not be as dramatic.
F. BARRIERS TO IMPLEMENTING THE POLICY
The three studies addressing barriers to integrating the commercial and industrial
bases have a common theme: Government regulations. Figure 6.1 depicts this common
link.
MILSPECS were found to be one of the major barriers preventing civil-military


















Source: Developed by researcher.
Figure 6.1. Common Link Among Studies Addressing Barriers to Civil-
Military Integration
specifications or standards unless they were inadequate. Civilian contractors may not be
aware of the reforms, or the acquisition workforce may not be implementing them.
MILSPECS were found to perform a necessary function of standardization and to prevent
integration problems noted in this research.
Accounting requirements, such as cost accounting standards, were also found to
hinder CMI of the DIB. However, even within the DoD, there are personnel who believe
that the regulations protect the Government and save money by preventing fraud. An
alternative may be to study which Generally Accepted Accounting Practices (GAAP) can
be used to gain insight into a contractor's costs. If the Government were to use a
contractor's existing records, which are suitable for financial and tax reporting, then the
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barrier could be removed. However, commercial accounting practices will not provide
the detailed cost information that can be obtained through cost accounting standards.
Another barriers is created by the unique contract requirements placed on
contractors for socioeconomic goals, source restrictions, fee limitations, criminal
penalties, and relations with suppliers. These regulations inflate the cost of any
procurement by adding requirements unrelated to the purpose of the weapons system.
They also restrict a contractor's ability to select the suppliers who provide the best value.
Instead, they require a contractor to select sources whom the Government determines
needs assistance. With rapid technological changes and a global economy, these
requirements may make any agreement unattractive to many non-defense firms.
A cultural barrier also restricts integration. Defense firms attempting conversion
tried, for the most part, to convert to Government-subsidized industries. In the Reddy
study, when defense firms were asked what was needed to diversify to the civilian
marketplace, the number one answer was Government reimbursement for civilian R&D
with other Government departments. This indicates that many firms in the defense
industry prefer working with the Government rather than moving into a competitive
commercial marketplace. The reasons commercial firms refuse to enter the defense
market have not changed since the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act. This evidence
may indicate that procurement personnel are not fully implementing acquisition reform.
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G. SUMMARY
Before the DoD can implement CMI, it must remove the impediments to making
it happen. The defense and commercial markets are not as different as they were when
Gansler described the differences in his 1989 book, Affording Defense. The remaining
differences in the markets are Government-imposed barriers that can be unilaterally
reduced or eliminated. To truly promote a policy of CMI, the DoD should adopt
commercial practices and standards. But its ultimate goal should be to use one set of
regulations governing all businesses engaged in interstate commerce. It is crucial to
remove impediments to CMI in addition to funding initiatives to hold up as examples.
The initiatives developed to date have been small, and their overall effect on achieving
CMI of the industrial base is questionable. Additionally, they have relied on annual
funding, which can be erratic. If success is proving that dual-use technologies can be
accomplished, then there are examples to offer. However, if treated as a mathematical or
scientific hypothesis, where only one example needs to be held up to disprove it, then it is
currently a failure. Before moving forward with a broad policy initiative to expand the
industrial base through CMI, the DoD must identify and then remove or isolate the causes
of the failure.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
The objective of this thesis was to study the policy option of civil-military
integration as a means of expanding the industrial base. To explore this subject, the
researcher reviewed the recent history of budget reductions and resulting mergers and
acquisitions in the defense market. The researcher also analyzed the characteristics of the
defense and traditional commercial markets, the advantages and disadvantages of civil-
military integration, and the barriers to implementation of the policy. This chapter
presents the conclusions of this thesis, offers recommendations, answers the primary and
subsidiary research questions, and suggests areas for further research.
B. CONCLUSIONS
1. Of the three methods found to expand the Defense Industrial Base
through civil-military integration, dual-use technology is currently the
most promising.
Previous attempts to integrate and diversify the industrial base through defense
conversion resulted in failures. The industry has transitioned from one made up of many
diversified defense contractors in too many declining segments to one comprised of a few
highly-focused companies. The remaining option is dual-use research and development
to exploit advanced commercial technologies, integrate commercial production facilities,
and insert commercial technologies in existing platforms.
2. CMI can provide necessary cost savings in an era of reduced budgets.
Provided that there is no significant change in the threat to national security, the
defense budget is expected to remain the same in real dollars for the foreseeable future.
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The cost of maintaining a separate defense base has become prohibitive and has resulted
in the mergers and consolidation of several defense contractors. Use of commercial
standards and practices can save procurement dollars. By promoting competition,
transferring civilian technology to defense use, and using leverage, the COSSI program
alone is expected to save three billion dollars over the next ten years.
3. The risks associated with CMI are the lack of reliability, logistic
support and compatibility.
As Chapter IV indicated, some personnel associated with the defense industry are
concerned about their ability to operate, support, and maintain non-MILSPEC items in
military environments. The needs for logistic support for these items and for the ability
to maintain systems incorporating them also add risk. Procuring offices must address
design practices for electronic components to reduce the risks associated with
commercial or non-developmental items. As technologies move rapidly in the
commercial sector, these risks must be mitigated by focusing on system architectures that
allow continual upgrade. This will reduce the likelihood of having to force a
manufacturer to make obsolete parts or warehouse repair parts. Standards followed by
commercial designers may be incompatible with each other. The uncertainty over
compatibility can inhibit a program manager's willingness to depart from MILSPEC
items. MILSPEC reform must be implemented carefully, and commercial items must be
judged according to their ability to perform in a military environment.
4. Civil-military integration should be concentrated at the early stages of
a weapons acquisition program.
Civil-military integration is best achieved at the earliest stages of a weapons
program. By starting with research and development, contracting offices can obtain the
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superior technologies available in the commercial sector and design them into a platform.
At the early phases of a weapons program, designers can establish the capabilities and
limitations of commercial items and determine whether they are acceptable. If they are
found acceptable, then the design must allow for the replacement and upgrade of the
components. The earlier a risk can be identified and compatibility problems worked out,
the sooner the various systems can be integrated. When dual-use technologies are
incorporated into the design, suppliers can use flexible manufacturing processes. As the
system moves closer to the production stage, opportunities to integrate commercial
technologies diminish due to higher integration costs and risks.
5. The greatest barriers to civil-military integration are regulatory.
Regulations imposed on Government contractors are the greatest barrier to civil-
military integration. For both defense contractors attempting to diversify to the
commercial market and commercial firms trying to enter the defense market, the common
impediments were: accounting requirements, military specifications, and unique
Government contract clauses. Some of these barriers may be necessary, as in the case of
military specifications, while others promote social goals that have little to do with
maintaining a strong industrial base. If the Government wishes to reap the rewards of the
commercial sector, then it must also accept the risks of working in the commercial
environment.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Eliminate or drastically reduce unique Government regulations.
If the major barriers between the commercial and defense markets are eliminated,
civil-military integration is more likely to occur. Acquisition reforms, to date, have not
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been successful in attracting firms to defense business. The DoD should target the
regulations that are the primary impediments to integration. Transition to dual-use
technologies is best accomplished early in the design stage and at the lower tiers, rather
than at the prime or integrator level, where design changes are risky. By eliminating the
"flowdown" requirements, prime contractors can partner with leading technological firms
to obtain state-of-the-art technology and increase the surge capacity of the DIB. As more
non-defense firms enter into partnerships, competition will increase, and the need for
many of the "flowdown" clauses should be eliminated.
2. Review current initiatives underway in promoting civil-military
integration.
DoD should study current dual-use initiatives to determine various causes of
failures and successes. DoD should then determine whether or not the failures can be
corrected or if they should be left strictly to defense contractors to correct. Finally, DoD
should build on the successes by looking for similar contracts or systems that may
benefit.
3. Expand acquisition reform to include a "commercial facility"
designation.
If an item is built in a factory alongside commercial items, and the defense
portion of the company is very small, then the Government should eliminate its unique
requirements. If the defense portion* of a firm's business is below a designated limit, it
would then be exempt from unique Government regulations. A contractor would then
have an incentive to increase its commercial sales to reduce the relative percent of
defense business. The Government would benefit from greater surge capacity, and the
efficiencies of running the commercial factory would spread to the defense items. Cost
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analysis using the contractor's existing accounting practices would verify whether the
price of the defense items was reasonable in relation to that of the commercial ones.
There are two concerns with this recommendation. First, contractors at the cusp of the
designated level may elect not to compete for additional Government contracts. Second,
verification of the level of Government and commercial work must be verifiable without
establishing additional requirements or agencies to monitor the contractors.
4. Contracting offices should address the risks of CMI in their
acquisition strategy.
An acquisition strategy pursuing civil-military integration may have to budget
more, rather than less, time due to compatibility problems resulting from integration.
Contracting officers seeking to use commercial products in lieu of MILSPEC items
should understand the environment in which the commercial product may have to
operate. Before purchasing a commercial or non-developmental item for stand-alone use
or for insertion into a military platform, contracting officers should obtain reliability and
maintainability data.
If there is a chance that a producer might stop manufacturing a component, then a
plan must be in place either to purchase the item through a designated second source or to
obtain limited rights to the technology. Both plans add significant costs which may
obviate any commercial savings.
Procurement officers should view the integration of commercial components or
NDIs as a design responsibility. They should acquire only systems that use open systems
architecture to eliminate or reduce the need for data rights. This will reduce the reliance
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on single-source components or products. Even with commercial standards in place,
different suppliers' products may not always be interchangeable or compatible.
The marketplace will drive the availability of selected components. With
diminished control of the marketplace through CMI, the Government should recognize
logistic support as a significant risk in the acquisition process. Therefore, contracting
officers should ensure that commercial items integrated into military systems can be
easily upgraded. If production of an older component is discontinued, it can be replaced
with the latest component in the marketplace.
D. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Question: What is the viability of civil-military integration as
a policy option for expanding the defense industrial base?
Civil-military integration is currently not a viable policy option for expanding the
defense industrial base. The risks of discontinued components, lack of standardization,
and security risks from technology transfers, as well as the extensive Government-
imposed barriers, prevent effective integration. For the foreseeable future, there will be
items so uniquely military that integration at the prime contract level will not be possible.
The Government has established many of the existing regulations that serve as barriers
for legitimate reasons. The task of removing them and changing the culture of those who
operate under them is a significant task. Removing the barriers and changing the culture
may take several years, if it occurs at all. Until then, other policy options for maintaining
the defense industrial base should be considered.
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2. Subsidiary Question 1: How does the weapons market differ from the
free market?
The weapons market and free market are different primarily in the contracting
methods each side currently uses and in the roles of the participants. Government
contracts for research and developmental products are generally cost-plus in order to
share risks with the contractor, while commercial markets rely almost exclusively on
fixed-price contracts. The Government also uses contracts that promote social goals and
programs that firms operating in the commercial environment do not have to consider.
The Government's role in the weapons market is that of a buyer, regulator,
specifier, and judge of claims. In the commercial market, a contractor serves as a buyer
and specifier. The primary difference is in the Government's regulatory role in the
defense market.
3. Subsidiary Question 2: How does civil-military integration contribute
to the desirable characteristics of the defense industrial base?
A unified industrial base provides surge capacity and potential manufacturing
capabilities that the nation may rely upon in the future. The use of civil-military
integration will enhance competition and result in a more efficient and innovative base
and, perhaps, less dependency on sole-source providers. The potential size of the
industrial base is increased through civil-military integration and therefore it may provide
national security benefits.
4. Subsidiary Question 3: What are the benefits and costs of civil-
military integration?
The benefits of civil-military integration are access to leading-edge technology,
affordability, and the ability to meet surge capacity. The military will be able to
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introduce the latest technologies into the development stages of a weapons program or
upgrade. Many commercial technologies and components can meet the performance
requirements of military systems at a lower cost. Close integration with commercial
manufacturing capabilities will make it easier to gradually increase production of systems
needed for a military effort.
The costs of civil-military integration are the increased complexity of integration
and the management of logistic support and maintainability. Weapon systems designed
to operate using a commercial component are at risk if the supplier discontinues
production and holds the data rights. Additionally, components manufactured under a
similar commercial standard may not always be substituted with each other in a weapons
system. The design stage will have to mitigate this risk.
5. Subsidiary Question 4: What are the barriers to civil-military
integration?
The barriers to civil-military integration are regulatory rather than technical.
While the Government promotes the integration of the defense and commercial industrial
bases through initiatives, it leaves in place the legislation and regulations that segregate
the two. The primary barriers identified were: accounting requirements, VQLSPECS,
unique contract requirements, and technical data rights. Regardless of the way in which
integration is to be accomplished—attracting commercial firms to defense work or
encouraging defense firms to move into commercial work—the common barrier is
Government regulation.
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6. Subsidiary Question 5: At what stage of the acquisition cycle should
DoD attempt to expand the defense industrial base through civil-
military integration?
Civil-military integration is best achieved at the earliest stages of a weapons
program. Market research can identify the superior technologies available in the
commercial sector and design them into a platform. During the early phases of a
weapons program, designers can establish the capabilities and limitations of commercial
items and determine whether they are acceptable for insertion into the platform. If they
are found acceptable, then the design must allow for the replacement and upgrade of the
components. Early identification of compatibility and integration risks will prevent
costly redesign prior to entering low-rate initial production. As the system moves closer
to the production stage, opportunities to integrate commercial technologies diminish due
to integration risks.
E. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This thesis identified areas that merit additional research, but did not
address them because they are beyond the scope of this study. These areas are:
1
.
An in-depth study of the dual-use initiatives to determine their success in
attracting commercial firms.
2. A dual-use initiative study that focuses on components that must be
integrated into higher assemblies. The issues of reliability, maintain-
ability, and logistic support could be presented.
3. A case study of the Commercial Operational Support Savings Initiative
which follows the transition of contractors from Stage I to Stage II. The
study would provide insight into concerns of participants in moving from
"other transactions" to traditional contracts.
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APPENDIX A. MAJOR MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 1990-1996
(VALUE IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) [REF. 67]
Date Action Value
July 1990 Loral Corp. Purchases Ford Aerospace $715
August 1992 Hughes Aircraft buys General Dynamics (GD)
Missiles
Loral Corp. buys LTV Missiles
$450
$254
October 1992 Carlyle Group buys GD Electronics $50
February 1993 Lockheed Corp. Buys GD Ft. Worth Division $1,500
April 1993 Martin Marietta Corp. Buys GE Aerospace $3,050
July 1993 Carlyle Group buys Philips/Magnavox Electric
Systems
$250
December 1993 Martin Marietta Corp. Buys GD Space Systems $209
January 1994 Loral Corp. buys IBM/Federal Systems Co. $1,485
February 1994 Westinghouse buys United Tech Corp, Norden
Systems
$45
March 1994 Northrop buys Grumman Corp. $2,170
May 1994 Allied Signal buys Textron Lycoming Turbine
Orbital Sciences buys Matra Hachette/Fairchild
$375
$93
September 1994 Lockheed and Martin Marietta announce merger $10,000
March 1995 Loral Corp. buys Unisys Defence $800
April 1995 Raytheon buys E-Systems $2,300
August 1995 GD buys Bath Iron works $300
September 1995 Hughes Aircraft buys Magnavox from Carlyle
Group
$370
December 1995 Grumman agrees to buy Westinghouse $3,000
January 1996 Lockheed Martin buys Loral $10,000
Source: Jane's Defence Weekly, Vol. 25, No. 3, p. 24, January 17, 1996.
101
102
APPENDIX B. MILESTONE DECISION POINTS [REF. 68]
A milestone is the decision point that separates the phases of a Major Defense
Acquisition Program (MDAP). For a definition ofMDAP see 10 USC Sect. 2430.
Milestone 0: Approval to Conduct Concept Studies
After the Joint Requirements Oversight Council validates the mission need for an
Acquisition Category (ACAT) I program, the USD (A&T) shall convene a Milestone
Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) to review the mission needs statement (MNS),
identify possible material alternatives, and authorize concept studies if they are deemed
necessary.
Milestone I: Approval to Begin a New Acquisition Program
The purpose of the Milestone I decision point is to determine if the results of
Phase warrant establishing a new acquisition program and to approve entry into Phase
I, Program Definition and Risk Reduction.




2. Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) objectives;
3. Acquisition Program Baseline (APB)(10 USC Sect. 2435 for ACAT I) ;
and
4. Phase I exit criteria.
Milestone II: Approval to Enter Engineering and Manufacturing
The purpose of the Milestone II decision point is to determine if the results of
Phase I warrant continuation of the program and to approve entry into Engineering and
Manufacturing Development (or software engineering and development for a software
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intensive system). The low-rate initial production (LRIP) strategy and decision authority
shall be considered at this milestone.





3. APB (10 USC Sect. 2435 for ACAT I);
4. Phase II exit criteria
5. LRIP quantities (10 USC Sect. 2400)
A favorable LRIP decision authorizes the Program Manager to commence LRIP
only. The PM is only authorized to commence full-rate production with further approval
of the MDA. There shall be normally no more than one decision (i.e. either low-rate or
full-rate) at the DAB level.
Milestone HI: Production or Fielding/Deployment Approval
The purpose of the Milestone III decision point is to authorize entrance into
production for an ACAT I or into deployment for an ACAT IA program.
At this milestone, the MDA shall approve the following:
1 Acquisition strategy;
2. APB (10 USC Sect. 2435 for ACAT I); and
3. Phase III exit criteria if appropriate
Note: The decision to proceed beyond LRIP cannot be finalized until the DOT&E
Beyond LRIP and LFT&E reports are received by the Congressional Defense
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